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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment1 is designed “‘to prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by law enforcement officials with the privacy and
personal security of individuals.’”2 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
government from imposing excessive bail in cases where it is proper to grant
bail.3 This Article looks at the intersection of these two federal constitutional
provisions in the context of federal bail determinations and asks whether
arrested persons can “choose” to relinquish some or all of their Fourth
Amendment rights in exchange for pretrial release from detention and, if
so, under what circumstances and with what, if any, limits.
The ability or inability of an arrested person to relinquish some privacy
and liberty rights to gain pretrial release is a significant issue because tens of
thousands of people are charged with federal crimes every year.4 Once
charged, each person appears before a federal judicial officer, usually a
magistrate judge, for a decision on whether he or she will await trial while
enjoying the comforts of home or, instead, be confined in jail until the
charges are adjudicated.5 Many defendants are detained in jail until trial.6
The Bail Reform Act establishes the standard for pretrial release in
federal court.7 The presiding judicial officer applies the Bail Reform Act to
determine whether there are conditions of release that will ensure the
arrested person’s appearance at trial and protect the safety of the

1.

The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1975)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).
4. For instance, in 2003, 94,916 persons were prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s
Offices and 83,419 pretrial criminal cases were conducted in federal court. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 1
(2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0303.pdf.
5. In 2003, sixty-four percent of pretrial defendants in the federal system (or
approximately 53,388) were detained in jail following an initial appearance or a detention
hearing. Id. at 42.
6. Id.
7. Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 524 (1979) (noting that the Bail Reform Act requires that a person in the federal system be
committed to a detention facility if less drastic measures will not assure the person’s presence at
trial).
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community in the meantime.8 However, the Bail Reform Act does not
address whether defendants can be asked or required to relinquish some of
their Fourth Amendment rights as one of the conditions of pretrial release.9
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether an
arrested person is legally permitted to exchange Fourth Amendment rights
for pretrial freedom. In fact, the Court has never resolved whether someone
convicted of a crime validly waives his Fourth Amendment rights by
“agreeing” to a blanket-search provision as part of his post-conviction release
on probation or his post-incarceration supervised release.10 Although the
Court has not settled either of these issues, it has, in other contexts, made
relevant observations about a criminal defendant’s relinquishment of one
right to save another.11 For instance, in the context of reviewing a habeas
petition in which an inmate claimed that he was put to an “impermissible
choice” between exercising his right to appeal a criminal conviction and
risking a potentially harsher sentence if he prevailed on such an appeal, the
Supreme Court declared:
“The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete
with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as to
which course to follow. . . . Although a defendant may have a right,
even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he
chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid
requiring him to choose.” . . . [T]he “threshold question is whether

8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3142; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act against a facial attack).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)–(xiv) (listing conditions that a magistrate judge may
impose when releasing a pretrial defendant but lacking any mention of Fourth Amendment
rights or waivers).
10. The Supreme Court, in its 2005 term, held that a government officer who conducts a
suspicionless search of a state parolee based merely on the parolee’s status as a parolee, does
not violate the Fourth Amendment, where, as a condition of release, the parolee agrees in
writing that he will submit to searches or seizures by a peace officer at any time, with or without
cause. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006). Nevertheless, the Court expressly
warned that its decision in Samson did not rest on the “consent” of the parolee. Id. at 2199–2200
n.3 (“[W]e decline to rest our holding today on the consent rationale.”).
11. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723–24 (1969) (noting that it would
be a “flagrant” due-process violation for a sentencing court to impose a heavier sentence (in a
re-sentencing situation) as a price for the defendant’s successful exercise of his right to appeal a
conviction); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968) (holding that the testimony a
criminal defendant gives during a pretrial hearing to establish standing to support the
exclusion of evidence in accordance with the Fourth Amendment is not admissible against the
same defendant at trial on the issue of his guilt or innocence). But see, e.g., Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 27–28 (1973) (refusing to extend the rule of Pearce to situations in
which a jury decides a defendant’s punishment following a defendant’s successful appeal,
provided that “improper and prejudicial information regarding the prior sentence is withheld”
from the second jury).
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compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the
policies behind the rights involved.”12
While the Court has never excused criminal defendants from making
tough choices, more than three decades ago it recognized that the
government’s power is not unlimited when it “needlessly chill[s] the
exercise of basic constitutional rights.”13 In some circumstances, the Court
has deemed it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another.”14 A recent decision from the Ninth
Circuit reiterates the concept that the government’s power is not boundless
when it asks a criminal defendant to give up one constitutional right in favor
of another.15 In an issue of first impression in the federal courts of appeal, a

12. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 32 (first alteration in original) (quoting Crampton v. Ohio, 402
U.S. 183, 213 (1971)). In Chaffin, a defendant was tried and convicted by a Georgia jury of a
capital offense of robbery. Id. at 18. After the jury convicted the defendant, the trial court
instructed the jury on sentencing, advising the jury that it was legally authorized to impose a
sentence of death, life, or a term of years. Id. The jury sentenced the defendant to fifteen years
of imprisonment. Id. The defendant appealed to the state court of appeals and lost but was later
successful in convincing a federal district court to grant his petition for habeas corpus, arguing
that the trial judge had incorrectly instructed the jury on an alibi defense. Id. at 18–19. Upon
granting the habeas writ, the district court ordered the defendant returned to state court for a
retrial. Id. at 19. The defendant was again convicted by the new jury. Id. As before, the jury was
then instructed on the authorized range of punishments. Id. The second jury returned a
sentence of life in prison. Id. at 20. The second jury was unaware of the fifteen-year sentence
chosen by the first. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the higher sentence. Id.
at 35. The Supreme Court has also authorized a criminal defendant to choose to plead guilty
and forego his right to trial by jury, even when the plea is “encouraged” by the defendant’s fear
of receiving the death penalty. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747–48 (1970) (holding
that such guilty pleas are legally valid, as long as they are voluntary and intelligent).
13. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581–82 (1968). In Jackson, three defendants
challenged the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute that created an offense
punishable by death, if the jury recommended that sentence. Id. at 570–71. There was no
comparable death provision in the kidnapping statute for defendants who waived the right to a
jury trial or for those who pled guilty. Id. at 571. The district court held the statute
unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute made “‘the risk of death’ the price for asserting the
right to jury trial.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn.
1967)). Although the Supreme Court ultimately saved most of the federal kidnapping statute by
severing the death-penalty provision, the Court agreed that as constructed by Congress, the Act
“impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right.” Id. at 572.
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority in Jackson. Id. at 570. In this 6-2 decision in which Justice
Marshall took no part, Justices White and Black dissented. Id. at 591–92.
14. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394. Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion in Simmons. Id. at
379. As in Jackson, Justice Marshall took no part. Id. at 394. Justices White and Black concurred
in part and dissented in part. Id. at 377, 399. Obviously, since the decisions in Jackson and
Simmons, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed significantly. Not one Justice who
decided these cases remains on the Court today. As a result, these decisions offer only limited
insight into how the current Court will view the subordination of one constitutional right to
another.
15. See generally United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit first
issued its Scott decision on September 9, 2005. United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888, 888 (9th Cir.
2005). Later, on June 9, 2006, the court issued an order denying rehearing en banc,
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divided panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that an arrested person does
not necessarily waive his Fourth Amendment rights even when he executes a
rights waiver as a means of negotiating his pretrial release.16
In contrast to the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit, this Article
contends that with appropriate judicial oversight, an arrestee can
appropriately and effectively waive some Fourth Amendment rights as
collateral for his liberty. This Article acknowledges that if a defendant is
permitted to bargain with his Fourth Amendment rights, an undeniable
tension results. The tension naturally creates a pressure-filled situation that
will almost always end with the subordination of Fourth Amendment rights.
But, the choice is the accused’s to make. Only the accused can fully evaluate
the importance of his Fourth Amendment rights and decide whether or not
to relinquish such rights to gain pretrial liberty. The Article maintains that
although the choice is always the defendant’s, the key to judging whether a
particular defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary rests with the limits
to such a waiver. A Fourth Amendment waiver must not be an unbridled,
whole-sale waiver of all constitutional and statutory rights. It must be
sufficiently tailored to further the reasonable law-enforcement goals for
imposing the waiver.
Various constitutional provisions will serve to limit the extent to which
the government can extract a Fourth Amendment waiver from a criminal
defendant. For instance, the Eighth Amendment proscribes excessive bail.17
Thus, bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
assure the presence of an accused at trial, or for an amount more than
necessary to protect the public pending trial, is excessive within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.18 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment, which
requires that all searches and seizures be “reasonable,”19 will prohibit an
unreasonable search of an arrested person during the pretrial period, even

withdrawing the September 9 opinion and replacing that decision with an amended opinion
and amended dissent. Scott, 450 F.3d at 864. In the June 2006 decision, seven circuit judges
dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 889.
16. Scott, 450 F.3d at 863–64; id. at 871 (“Scott’s assent to his release conditions does not
by itself make an otherwise unreasonable search reasonable . . . .”).
17. In pertinent part, the Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. The right to bail found in the Eighth Amendment is not absolute. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987). Nevertheless, “bail shall not be excessive in those cases where
it is proper to grant bail.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952). “The command of
the Eighth Amendment that ‘Excessive bail shall not be required . . .’ at the very least obligates
judges passing upon the right to bail to deny such relief only for the strongest of reasons.”
Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (1968) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII).
19. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (expressing that all Fourth Amendment
searches must be reasonable); see also Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006)
(explaining that the Court’s general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires the Court “to
determine whether a search is reasonable”).
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if the person has “consented” to such a search or has “waived” the usual
probable-cause requirement.
In short, the answer to whether an arrested person can validly and
effectively waive (at least some of) his Fourth Amendment rights in
exchange for freedom from pretrial detention is not a simple yes or no.
Instead, the solution hinges on the now familiar “‘totality of the
circumstances’” test.20 That test will require the magistrate judge21 to
consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances known about the
defendant, the crime alleged, and the defendant’s background, and decide
whether the pressure on the accused to waive her Fourth Amendment rights
is so great that it results in an “impermissible burden upon the exercise of a
constitutional right”22 or whether, in contrast, the accused’s decision is a
“knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”23 Under some circumstances, a
pretrial waiver is valid, and under other more coercive conditions, it is not.
This Article develops in three parts. Part I looks at pretrial detention
and pretrial release conditioned on a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. It
begins with an overview of the Bail Reform Act and explores the recent
decision from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Scott, which held that an
arrested person does not waive all of the privacy protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, even when he signs a written Fourth Amendment
waiver of rights to gain pretrial release.24 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Scott is discussed as a tool for analyzing whether the government violates the
Constitution or illegally coerces an arrested person when it asks an arrestee
to choose between liberty, with limited Fourth Amendment privacy, and
incarceration. Part I also briefly reviews the Supreme Court precedent that
nibbles at the fringes of the pretrial Fourth Amendment consent issue and
reviews other circuit court decisions that have decided analogous, but not
identical, issues regarding post-conviction Fourth Amendment waivers.
Part II considers the tension created when an arrested person is asked
to choose between sacrificing the privacy rights he normally enjoys under

20. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001))
(stating that the Court examines the “totality of the circumstances” to decide if a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–
39 (1983) (applying the “totality of the circumstances test”).
21. Or another appropriate judicial officer. See Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C. §
3141(a) (2000) (allowing any judicial officer authorized to order the arrest of a person in
accordance with § 3041 to make a bail determination); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1)
(authorizing “a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is available, a judge of
a state court of record in the district—to issue a warrant to . . . seize a person . . . within the
district”).
22. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968).
23. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (approving of voluntarily and
intelligently entered guilty pleas, which, nevertheless, sacrifice constitutional rights).
24. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2006).

WILSON_PP_TO_ILR

166

11/14/2006 2:21:06 PM

92 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2006]

the Fourth Amendment and forgoing an opportunity to avoid indefinite
pretrial detention with even fewer rights. Part II identifies the policies for
and against allowing a pretrial waiver in exchange for release on conditions,
examines the proper legal standard by which a magistrate judge should
evaluate such a waiver, and concludes that the person facing pretrial
detention is in the best position to gauge the value of his or her Fourth
Amendment rights.
Part III asserts that the key to a legally permissible pretrial Fourth
Amendment waiver is the limits on that waiver. It declares that if Fourth
Amendment waivers are permitted, established legal principles effectively
confine them. Part III concludes that the Constitution already limits every
waiver and that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Bail Reform
Act, and basic contract concepts also restrict the scope of such waivers.
I.

THE LAW GOVERNING PRETRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE CONDITIONED
ON A FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER
A. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 authorizes detention of arrested persons
in some instances and their release with conditions in other situations.25 In
federal criminal cases, an arrested person is typically brought before a
United States magistrate judge for a bond or bail determination.26 To
determine bail, the magistrate judge conducts a hearing to determine
whether there is a condition or a combination of conditions that will
reasonably assure the appearance of the arrested person at a subsequent
trial.27 If the magistrate judge decides in favor of release, she must impose
any conditions necessary to ensure the safety of other persons (such as
witnesses) and the community pending the trial.28
At a detention hearing, an arrested person has the statutory right to
legal counsel and, if financially unable to obtain such representation, a right
to the appointment of counsel.29 In addition, the arrestee has the benefit of

25. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (outlining the four possible outcomes of a detention hearing,
including: (1) release on personal recognizance or an unsecured-appearance bond; (2) release
on a condition or combination of conditions; (3) temporary detention; or (4) detention
pending trial).
26. Id. § 3141(a). Any other judicial officer authorized to order the arrest of someone for
allegedly committing a federal crime may also make a bond or bail decision. Id.
27. Id. § 3142(e)–(f).
28. Id. For example, the magistrate judge might release an arrestee, provided he agrees to
live with a designated person, maintain his current employment with a specified employer at a
designated location, and avoid the excessive use of alcohol or any use of unprescribed narcotic
drugs. See id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The judge might release the arrested person to a half-way house,
where he could leave during the day to work, but would be expected to return by a certain time
each day. See id.
29. Id. § 3142(f).
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a clear and convincing standard of proof requirement imposed on the
government.30 The arrestee is also afforded an opportunity to testify, to
present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present other pertinent
information.31 The rules of evidence governing the admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of
information at the bail hearing.32 Therefore, a defendant can proffer
evidence in favor of his pretrial release.33
Following the hearing, the magistrate judge is required to “issue an
order” indicating that, pending trial, the person should be either released or
detained.34 The judge may release the arrested person on personal
recognizance after execution of an unsecured-appearance bond, subject to
the condition that the person not commit a crime during the pretrial-release
period.35 If, however, the magistrate judge determines that release on
personal recognizance or after execution of an unsecured-appearance bond
will not assure the appearance of the person at trial, or will endanger other
persons or the community, the judicial officer can release the arrestee only
on a condition or combination of conditions.36
In determining whether there are conditions of release that will satisfy
the appearance and safety requirements, the judge considers many factors,
taking into account the totality of the circumstances.37 In this regard, the
Bail Reform Act provides a nonexclusive list of conditions that a judicial
officer may impose.38 The magistrate judge must choose the conditions that

30. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987)
(explaining that when the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrested person poses a threat to an individual or the community, a court may detain the
person pending trial to abate the threat).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 3142(a).
35. Id. § 3142(a)(1), (b).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(A), (B).
37. Id. § 3142(g). These factors include: (1) “the nature . . . of the offense charged,
including whether the crime is [one] of violence”; (2) “the weight of the evidence against the
[accused]”; (3) “the history and characteristics of the [arrestee], including the person’s physical
and mental condition, . . . employment, financial resources, . . . ties to the community, criminal
history, [etc.]”; and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to . . . the community [if the
arrestee is released.]” Id.
38. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). A judicial officer may require that the arrestee: (1) “remain in the
custody of a designated person[] who agrees [to supervise the arrestee] and . . . report any
violation of a release condition to the court”; (2) “maintain employment[] or . . . actively seek
employment”; (3) attend school; (4) restrict the arrestee’s personal associations and travel; (5)
“avoid . . . contact with [the] alleged victim[s] of the crime and any potential witness[es] who
may testify”; (6) report to pretrial services on a regular basis; (7) abide by a curfew; (8) avoid
possession of a firearm; (9) avoid “excessive use of alcohol” or narcotic drugs without a
prescription; (10) undergo medical or other treatment, “including treatment for drug or
alcohol dependency”; (11) “execute an agreement to forfeit [property for] failing to appear”;
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are the “least restrictive.”39 In other words, the Bail Reform Act establishes a
liberal policy in favor of pretrial release.40
When a magistrate judge releases an arrested person, the judge must
include a clear and specific written statement to “serve as a guide for the
person’s conduct,” listing the conditions to which the releasee is subject.41
The Bail Reform Act also directs the magistrate judge to advise the person of
the penalties and consequences for violating any condition of release.42
If the court were to permit an arrested person to offer his Fourth
Amendment rights as a type of collateral for his pretrial release under the
applicable provisions of the Bail Reform Act, the arrestee would acquire an
additional tool for negotiating pretrial liberty during the detention-hearing
process.43 Section 3142(c)(1)(B) of the Bail Reform Act instructs the
magistrate judge to choose the least-restrictive conditions to serve the goals
of the Act.44 Also, section 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) provides that in addition to the
condition(s) expressly identified in the Act, the magistrate judge may release
a putative defendant subject to “any other condition that is reasonably
necessary” to assure her appearance and the safety of the community.45
Because the Act allows for the possibility that other conditions may
adequately fulfill the goals of the Bail Reform Act, an arrested person
seeking freedom from detention could offer to waive some of her Fourth
Amendment rights as an additional assurance to convince the judge that
waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights is the least-restrictive condition
necessary to justify her putative release under the Bail Reform Act. An
arrested person acquires this additional bargaining chip when she holds the
power to deal away some of her privacy. This leverage can prove especially
important to indigent defendants who have no property and few, if any,
other assurances to give the magistrate judge that she will appear at trial and
avoid criminal conduct in the meantime. In an appropriate case, a
(12) “execute a bail bond with solvent sureties”; (13) “return to custody for specified hours”;
and (14) “satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of
the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community.” Id.
There is no specific mention of a Fourth Amendment-type waiver in the Bail Reform Act. See id.
39. Id.
40. See id. § 3142(b) (requiring that the magistrate judge release an arrested person on
personal recognizance or pursuant to an unsecured bond, unless the judge affirmatively finds
that such release will not serve the goals of the Bail Reform Act); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
536 n.18 (1979) (noting that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 implemented a “liberal policy in favor
of . . . release”). This demand for the least-restrictive conditions is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive bail.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h).
42. Id. An arrested person may appeal the magistrate judge’s decision on detention or
release. Id. § 3145(a).
43. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (explaining that the magistrate judge may choose from several
conditions for release and should choose the least-restrictive conditions).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv).
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magistrate judge may be satisfied that even if an arrested person is released
pending trial, she will not pose an undue risk of flight or danger to the
community, provided she agrees to unannounced, warrantless, suspicionless
searches of her person and/or property.46 In some instances, such a
concession may be the only condition that will convince the judge to release
the putative defendant from pretrial detention.
In an apparent effort to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of
arrested persons, the Ninth Circuit has effectively denied arrested persons
this bargaining tool by holding that such waivers of Fourth Amendment
rights are ineffective.47
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
In a matter of first impression in the federal courts of appeal,48 the
Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v. Scott that an arrested person
does not waive his Fourth Amendment rights, even when he “agrees,” as a
means of acquiring pretrial release, to allow his home to be searched at any
time without a warrant.49 The Ninth Circuit concluded that such searches
can be unreasonable despite the arrestee’s “consent” and, therefore, invalid
under the Fourth Amendment.50 Accordingly, the police may violate an
arrested person’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching his home without
probable cause, even if the person consented to just such a warrantless
search as a condition of his pretrial release.51
The defendant in Scott had been arrested for drug-possession crimes
and charged in a Nevada state court.52 While awaiting trial, he was released
on his own recognizance after “agreeing” to a blanket-search provision.53 In
other words, to gain his liberty:
Scott agreed to submit to “random drug and alcohol testing,
anytime of the day or night by any peace officer without a warrant”;
and to submit himself, his residence and his vehicle “to search and

46. For instance, in a drug case in which the defendant has no criminal history, or in a
case alleging the solicitation of a minor for sex over the Internet, there may be no better check
on the suspect’s criminal behavior than random, unannounced, warrantless searches of his
home and/or computer.
47. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 887–88 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(opining that the majority’s decision, far from being a “liberty-enhancing” decision, will deny
many pretrial detainees the option of “being released on [their own recognizance] and
sleeping in their own beds in exchange for agreeing to a limited number of conditions that the
state believes will protect the public and secure the attendance of the accused at trial”).
48. Id. at 864 (majority opinion).
49. Id. at 868, 872.
50. Id. at 871–72.
51. Id. at 868 (“Scott’s consent to any search is only valid if the search in question (taking
the fact of consent into account) was reasonable.”).
52. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865.
53. Id.
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seizure by any peace officer anytime day or night without a warrant
for C/S [controlled substances and] ALCOHOL.”54
Shortly after Scott’s pretrial release from state detention, officers
received a tip from an informant indicating that Scott was using drugs and
storing weapons in his home.55 Because of the tip, officers went to Scott’s
home to conduct a “compliance visit.”56 Officers first administered a urine
test to Scott.57 That test initially (albeit incorrectly) indicated that Scott had
recently used methamphetamine.58 When Scott’s urine tested positive, the
officers arrested him and began to search his house.59 The officers’ search
uncovered a shotgun.60 The government conceded that there was no
probable cause for the search but argued that the search was, nevertheless,
valid because the government had two special needs to search: protecting
the community from defendants during their pretrial release and ensuring
this defendant’s presence at trial.61
A federal grand jury indicted Scott for unlawful possession of the
shotgun uncovered during the search.62 Scott moved to suppress the gun,
and the district court granted the motion, reasoning that the officers
needed but lacked probable cause to justify the search.63 A Ninth Circuit
panel, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the district court’s ruling
suppressing the shotgun.64 In evaluating whether the search of Scott’s home
violated the Fourth Amendment, given that Scott had signed a form
agreeing to such searches, the Ninth Circuit framed the pertinent inquiries
as: (1) “whether the searches—the drug test and the search of Scott’s
house—were valid because Scott consented to them as a condition of his
release,” and (2) “whether the government can induce Scott to waive his
Fourth Amendment rights by conditioning pretrial release on such a
waiver.”65
In deciding these issues, the Ninth Circuit first noted the general rule
that “whether a search has occurred depends on whether a reasonable
54. Id. at 875 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting pretrial-release
conditions). Read literally and logically, the search provision to which Scott agreed could have
been interpreted to require probable cause, but no warrant. The Scott court did not draw this
fine of a distinction. See id. at 873 (majority opinion) (noting that the form Scott signed
explicitly waived the warrant requirement and “implicitly” the probable-cause requirement).
55. Id. at 876 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Scott, 450 F.3d at 876 (Bybee, J., dissenting); id. at 865 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 865 n.2 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 865.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 865, 869.
62. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 875.
65. Id. at 865 & n.4.
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expectation of privacy has been violated.”66 Next, the court reasoned that
someone released pretrial retains “‘his or her Fourth Amendment right to
be free of unreasonable seizures.’”67 After analyzing these issues, the Ninth
Circuit declared that “Scott’s consent to any search [was] only valid if the
search in question (taking the fact of consent into account) was
reasonable.”68 According to the court, “Scott’s assent to his release
conditions does not by itself make an otherwise unreasonable search
reasonable. . . . [T]o the extent his assent decreased his reasonable
expectation of privacy, we hold that the decrease was insufficient to
eliminate his expectation of privacy in his home.”69 In reaching its
conclusion that the search was not reasonable using a “totality of the
circumstances” approach,70 the court distinguished between probationers
66. Id. at 867 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
67. Scott, 450 F.3d at 868 (quoting Cruz v. Kavai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.
2002)).
68. Id. By itself, this conclusion is unremarkable. For if a search is totally unrelated to a
legitimate law-enforcement need to search or is conducted simply to harass, this author agrees
that the reasonableness requirement in the Fourth Amendment could be breached in spite of
consent.
69. Id. at 871–72.
70. Id. at 872. The Supreme Court evaluates “‘the totality of circumstances’ to determine
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Samson v.
California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118
(2001)). As part of this totality analysis, the Court assesses the “degree to which [a search or
seizure] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” and compares the intrusion against the degree
of need for the search or seizure to promote “legitimate governmental interests.” Id.
As part of the Ninth Circuit’s evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the court
in Scott considered that Scott had reduced his expectations of privacy by signing the form that
waived a warrant requirement. Scott, 450 F.3d at 873–74. But the court also considered that Scott
was merely charged with a crime, not a post-conviction probationer with far fewer privacy and
liberty interests. Id. In addition to analyzing the facts using the totality-of-the-circumstances
standard, the Ninth Circuit deemed the search of Scott and his home unreasonable under a
“special needs” analysis. Id. at 872. As the Scott court explained, the “reasonableness” required
by the Fourth Amendment normally demands that a search or seizure be supported by
probable cause. Id. at 868; see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). However, in
limited circumstances, the government can search or seize on less than probable cause, for
instance, when “‘special needs,’ beyond the normal need for law enforcement” demand such
search or seizure. Scott, 450 F.3d at 868 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873); see Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990) (holding that a state’s use of highway-sobriety
checkpoints, which allowed for seizure of cars on less than individualized suspicion to check for
intoxicated drivers, was consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness). But see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (finding that a
highway-checkpoint program with the primary purpose of intercepting drugs violated the
Fourth Amendment). “Thus, when probable cause would normally be required, ‘special needs’
can justify searches based on less . . . .” Scott, 450 F.3d at 868 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 664–65 (1995)). The Ninth Circuit found that both of the
government’s proffered special needs were legally inadequate to justify the search of Scott’s
home. Id. at 872. In this regard, the court concluded that “[t]he government in this case has
relied on nothing more than a generalized need to protect the community and a blanket
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(the Supreme Court has upheld searches of probationers based on
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause),71 and persons on pretrial
release.72 A majority of the panel deemed the distinction “constitutionally
relevant.”73
The court accepted that “Scott had a reduced expectation of privacy
because he had signed a form that, on its face, explicitly waived the warrant
requirement and implicitly . . . waived the probable cause requirement for
drug testing.”74 But the court fastened on the fact that Scott had not been
convicted of the charged crime.75 “‘Probation, like incarceration, is a form of
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict,
finding, or plea of guilty.’”76 The court distinguished probationers from
arrestees: “People released pending trial, by contrast, have suffered no
judicial abridgment of their constitutional rights.”77 Thus, according to the
court, “Scott, far from being a post-conviction conditional releasee, was out
on his own recognizance before trial. His privacy and liberty interests were
far greater than a probationer’s.”78 The Scott court reasoned:
Since the government concedes there was no probable cause to test
Scott for drugs, Scott’s drug test violated the Fourth Amendment.
Probable cause to search Scott’s house did not exist until the drug
test came back positive. The validity of the house search . . . is
derivative of the initial drug test. That search is likewise invalid; its
fruits must be suppressed.79
The court ultimately resolved that “[a] search of Scott or his house on
anything less than probable cause is not supported by the totality of the
circumstances in this case.”80
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit, the only federal court of appeals to have
decided the issue, has held that an arrested person does not necessarily
relinquish her Fourth Amendment rights even when she signs a Fourth
Amendment waiver to gain her pretrial release.81

assertion that drug-testing is needed to ensure Scott’s appearance at trial. Both are insufficient.”
Id.
71. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873–74.
72. Scott, 450 F.3d at 873.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 872 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874).
77. Scott, 450 F.3d at 872.
78. Id. at 873–74.
79. Id. at 874–75.
80. Id.
81. The court did not hold that a pretrial waiver can never be valid. Id. at 872 & n.12.
Instead, it balanced the government’s asserted interests in conducting the search against Scott’s
interests in privacy in his home, taking into account that Scott signed the waiver form. Id. at
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C. THE WORD FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether an arrested
person can validly waive his Fourth Amendment rights as a means to gain
release from pretrial detention. In fact, the Court has never specifically
addressed whether someone convicted of a crime82 waives her Fourth
Amendment rights by “agreeing” to blanket searches as part of her postconviction release.83 Although the Court has avoided resolving the consent
issue in these contexts,84 it has addressed and authorized invasive conditions
during pretrial detention,85 has upheld warrantless searches of postconviction probationers on grounds other than consent,86 and has counted
872, 874. Under both the special-needs analysis and the reasonableness-under-the-totality-of-thecircumstances approach, the court concluded that the search required probable cause. Id. The
outcome of the case may well have been different if the search had involved Scott’s car or his
workspace. See id. at 871 (focusing on the unique privacy interests of the home and noting a
special “reluctan[ce]” to “indulge” the government’s claimed special need “because Scott’s
privacy interest in his home . . . is at its zenith”).
82. Whether following a jury trial or through entering a plea of guilty.
83. In United States v. Knights, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to
resolve the consent issue. 534 U.S. 112, 114–23 (2001). In Knights, a sentencing court ordered a
defendant released on probation, provided he agreed to submit to random, warrantless
searches as part of that probation. Id. at 114. The defendant agreed and executed the requisite
written consent for his release. Id. Later, when officers conducted a search of the probationer’s
apartment (based on reasonable suspicion), as permitted by the terms of the defendant’s
probation, the defendant contended that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
at 114–15. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the government asked the
Court to declare the search valid based on the defendant’s consent. Id. at 118. The Court did
not reach this issue. Id. Instead, it found the search reasonable under a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis. Id. (“We need not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent . . . because we conclude that the search of Knights was
reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of the
circumstances.”).
In the Supreme Court’s 2005 term, it again encountered a case that raised a postconviction-consent-to-search issue. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). In Samson, the
Court was asked to determine whether a California statute violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 2194. The statute required all prisoners released on parole to sign a written agreement in
which the parolee consented to searches or seizures by any peace officer at any time without a
warrant and without cause. Id. at 2196. Once again, rather than decide the case based solely on
the parolee’s consent to suspicionless searches, the Court considered the parolee’s written
acceptance of the search provision as one factor among the totality of the circumstances,
suggesting that the search in question was reasonable as the Fourth Amendment requires. Id. at
2199 (“Examining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a
parolee . . . including the plain terms of the parole search conditions, we conclude that
petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”);
id. at 2199 n.3 (“[W]e need not reach the issue whether ‘acceptance of the search condition
constituted consent in the Schneckloth [v. Bustamonte] sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118 (2001))).
84. See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199 n.3; Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
85. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see infra Part I.C.1 (discussing Bell).
86. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); see infra Part I.C.2 (discussing Griffin).
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weighing

in

favor

of

Fourth

[2006]
Amendment

The Government Can Detain Arrested Persons Prior to Trial

The Supreme Court has authorized the government to subject arrested
persons to pretrial detention entailing sobering restrictions and invasive
searches. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that “the
Government . . . may detain [an arrested person] to ensure his presence at
trial and may subject him to restrictions and conditions . . . so long as those
conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise
violate the Constitution.”88 The Supreme Court in Bell declared that the
“[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement in a [pretrial detention] facility.”89 The Court rejected the
Fourth Amendment claims of pretrial detainees, including their challenge
to a detention facility’s requirement that detainees submit to visual bodycavity strip searches following every “contact” visit with someone from
outside the institution.90 Emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment
“prohibits only unreasonable searches,” the Court rejected the argument
that such invasive strip searches were unreasonable.91
Not only has the Court accepted the government’s power to subject
pretrial detainees to such intensely intrusive detention conditions as strip
searches, but it has also endorsed the government’s view that pretrial release
may be accompanied by significant restrictions on privacy and liberty.92 The
Court has commented that the government can impose “burdensome
conditions” on an arrested person during pretrial release.93 The Court has
also said that “[t]here are many kinds of pretrial release and many degrees
of conditional liberty.”94 In short, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourth Amendment as tolerating restrictions on the rights and liberties of
arrested persons, whether detained or conditionally released.95

87. See supra note 83 (discussing Knights and Samson).
88. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536–37. Bell was a class-action lawsuit challenging numerous
conditions of pretrial confinement at a federally operated short-term custodial facility in New
York City. Id. at 523, 525.
89. Id. at 537
90. Id. at 558.
91. Id. at 558–59 (citation omitted).
92. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987) (rejecting a claim that the Bail
Reform Act, which expressly authorizes an array of extensive conditions for pretrial release, was
facially unconstitutional); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (noting, in dicta, that
pretrial release may be accompanied by extensive conditions).
93. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114. Gerstein was a class action in which the plaintiffs claimed that
criminal defendants maintain a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on probable cause
when charged by information, rather than by a grand-jury indictment. Id. at 107.
94. Id. at 125 n.26 (citations omitted).
95. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536–37; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125.
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The Court’s validation of pretrial detention and its approval of
restrictions on those persons released pretrial does not answer the Fourth
Amendment waiver issue. However, the Court’s acceptance of the
government’s power to infringe on a detainee’s most personal right of
bodily integrity,96 and its acceptance of burdensome conditions on other,
less dangerous persons who have never been adjudged guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, shows the Court’s general willingness to allow the
government to intrude on rights of arrested persons. This general
willingness suggests that the Court would also look favorably at Fourth
Amendment waivers in the pretrial context.
2.

The Government Can Search Probationers’ Homes Without a Warrant

In addition to its precedent addressing some of the Fourth Amendment
burdens that detained persons and those released on conditions must
endure while awaiting trial, the Supreme Court has twice considered the
Fourth Amendment rights of post-conviction probationers whose homes
were searched without a warrant. The first time was in Griffin v. Wisconsin97
and the second in United States v. Knights.98
In Griffin, the Court evaluated the warrantless search of a probationer’s
home.99 Griffin was on probation for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and
obstructing an officer.100 Under Wisconsin law, as a probationer, Griffin was
in the legal “custody” of the State Department of Health and Social
Services.101 A regulation issued by that agency permitted any probation
officer to search a probationer’s home on “reasonable grounds,” rather than
probable cause.102 Pursuant to that regulation, probation officers searched
Griffin’s home following a tip from a police detective that there might be
guns in Griffin’s apartment.103 Officers found a handgun during their
search,104 so Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.105 Prior to his jury trial, Griffin moved to suppress the gun.106
The Court did not decide whether, as a probationer, Griffin had
“consented” to such searches as a term of his probation. Rather, the Court

96. The Court has unquestionably recognized a right of personal privacy within the
Constitution, although the source of the right has been hotly disputed. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
97. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870–71 (1987).
98. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114–15 (2001).
99. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870–71.
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 870–71.
103. Id. at 871.
104. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871.
105. Id. at 872.
106. Id.
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applied a “special needs” analysis and held that the warrantless search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because the search “was carried out
pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfie[d] the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement.”107 The Supreme Court observed that it had
previously held that “in certain circumstances government investigators
conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to
the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements as long as their searches
meet ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards.’”108 In other words,
the Court was content to allow a warrantless search conducted pursuant to a
regulation, as long as the regulation was reasonable in that it furthered a
legitimate government interest for conducting the search.109 After finding
that the regulation satisfied the Fourth Amendment, the Court expressed,
more generally, that a state’s operation of a probation system presents
“‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. Probation, like
incarceration, is ‘a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an
offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.’”110
Although the Court in Griffin did not evaluate the consent issue, it
addressed the impact of probation on a person’s expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment when it emphasized that probationers “do
not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . .
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation]
restrictions.’”111 While the Court distinguished probationers from other,
unconvicted persons, it nevertheless expressly acknowledged that even a
probationer’s home, “like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’”112
More than a decade after Griffin, the Supreme Court again considered a
probationer’s Fourth Amendment challenge to a search of his home in
United States v. Knights.113 As in Griffin, the Court decided the case on
grounds other than consent, but still validated the warrantless search.114 This

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 873.
Id. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
Id. at 873–74 (quoting GEORGE G. KILLINGER, HAZEL B. KERPER & PAUL F. CROMWELL,
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (1976) [hereinafter PROBATION
AND PAROLE]).
111. Id. at 874 (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480
(1972)).
112. Id. at 873.
113. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114–15 (2001).
114. Id. at 118. The Court deemed it unnecessary to decide “whether Knights’ acceptance
of the [probation] search condition constituted consent” to waive his Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. Rather, the Court weighed the degree of intrusion upon Knights’s privacy against the
government’s legitimate need for the search. Id. at 118–19. On balance, the Court was
convinced that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the search was reasonable.
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time, there was no state regulation authorizing the search.115 Knights had
been sentenced to “summary probation” for a drug offense.116 His probation
order required him to “‘[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of
residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a
search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation
officer or law enforcement officer.’”117 Knights signed the probation order
immediately below a line that said, “‘I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY, READ
AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
PROBATION AND AGREE TO ABIDE BY SAME.’”118
While Knights was still on probation and subject to this condition,
someone burned a telecommunications facility, and the local sheriff’s
department suspected that Knights was involved in the fire.119 After
conducting surveillance of Knights’s apartment, a detective who was aware of
Knights’s probation order—and therefore believed that a warrant was
unnecessary—searched Knights’s apartment for evidence of Knights’s
involvement in the arson.120 Knights moved to suppress evidence found
during the apartment search that implicated him in the fire.121
The Supreme Court framed the pertinent issue as “whether a search
pursuant to this probation condition, and supported by reasonable
suspicion, satisfied the Fourth Amendment.”122 The Court ultimately
concluded that the search was “reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment” because it was “supported by reasonable suspicion and
authorized by a condition of probation.”123 The government had urged a
different justification. It argued that Knights had consented to the search
when he signed the probation order.124 The Court noted that the
government viewed “Knights’ acceptance of the search condition []as
voluntary because he had the option of rejecting probation and going to
prison instead, which the Government argue[d wa]s analogous to the
voluntary decision defendants often make to waive their right to a trial and
accept a plea bargain.”125 Despite the government’s argument, the Supreme
Court did not decide the case on the basis of Knights’s consent:
Id. at 119–21. Nevertheless, the Court in Knights expressly recognized Knights’s signature on the
probation form as “a salient circumstance” in the totality-of-the-circumstances Fourth
Amendment evaluation. Id. at 118.
115. See id. at 117.
116. Id. at 114.
117. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the probation order).
118. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114 (quoting the probation order).
119. Id. at 114–15.
120. Id. at 115.
121. Id. at 116.
122. Id. at 114.
123. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
124. Id. at 118.
125. Id.
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We need not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search
condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth [v. Bustamonte]
sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights,
however, because we conclude that the search of Knights was
reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of
“examining the totality of the circumstances[]” . . . .126
In sum, Knights, like Griffin, left at least two important questions
unresolved: (1) whether a convicted person (let alone an arrested person)
can validly consent to a blanket waiver of his or her Fourth Amendment
rights to gain release from incarceration on probation, and (2) whether any
such waiver can, without more, justify a search of a person’s home on less
than probable cause.
Griffin teaches, on one hand, that probationers’ homes are protected by
the Fourth Amendment.127 On the other, Griffin declares that probationers
do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every other citizen is entitled.128
Although Griffin reiterates these clear rules at the boundaries, it fails to
resolve several issues relevant to whether the government can lawfully
subject arrested persons to Fourth Amendment searches on less than
probable cause.129 For example, is a pretrial-services program the equivalent
of a probation program for purposes of the special-needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment? In other words, if an arrested person is released under
the supervision of a pretrial-services officer, is a search conducted pursuant
to such a program exempted by the special-needs exception from the usual
Fourth Amendment analysis? Furthermore, are persons released pretrial the
equivalent of probationers for purposes of all Fourth Amendment issues?
There is at least one key difference between the pretrial setting and the
post-conviction setting. Arrested persons have not been restricted “‘after
verdict, finding, or plea of guilty’” and cannot be punished.130 They are not
convicts. They are not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a
jury of their peers following an evidentiary trial, which is accompanied by
guarantees of due process and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, crossexamination, confrontation, and other constitutional protections.
Nevertheless, in almost all cases in which a person is arrested on a federal
charge, a neutral magistrate judge promptly determines that probable cause

126. Id. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). The Court also did not
decide “whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 120 n.6.
127. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (“A probationer’s home, like anyone
else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’”).
128. Id. at 874 (declaring that probationers enjoy only conditional liberty contingent on
special probation restrictions).
129. See id. at 873–74 (addressing the rules that fall at the extremes without resolving other
complexities).
130. Id. (quoting PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 110, at 14).

WILSON_PP_TO_ILR

11/14/2006 2:21:06 PM

THE PRICE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE

179

exists for the charge; thus, there is a reasonable probability that the arrestee
did commit a crime. And, every person charged with a serious federal crime
presents some risk of flight from prosecution. Some arrestees obviously
present more than a flight risk. They may present a risk of harm to
themselves, witnesses, and/or the community.
3.

The Government Can Search a Parolee’s Person Without
Reasonable Suspicion and Absent a Warrant

Recently, in Samson v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawenforcement officer acts reasonably and complies with the Fourth
Amendment when he conducts a suspicionless search on a public street of a
person who has been released from prison on parole pursuant to a state law
that requires the person to “‘agree in writing to be subject to search or
seizure by a . . . peace officer at any time . . . with or without a search warrant
and with or without cause.’”131
Samson was paroled from prison in accordance with a California law
that made his parole dependent on his signing a form in which he “agreed”
to random, warrantless searches with or without cause.132 While on parole,
subject to this condition, a police officer stopped Samson on the street,
believing that Samson was wanted for a parole violation.133 During the stop,
the officer learned that he was mistaken; there was no outstanding warrant
for Samson.134 Notwithstanding this new information, the officer searched
Samson anyway “based solely on [Samson]’s status as a parolee.”135 In
Samson’s breast pocket, the officer found a cigarette box containing
methamphetamine.136
Based on the methamphetamine found in his pocket, Samson was
charged in a California state court with unlawful possession of the drug.137
Before trial, Samson moved to suppress the methamphetamine, but the trial
judge denied the motion.138 A jury convicted Samson, and he was sentenced
to seven years of imprisonment.139
In upholding the search as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court applied the usual totality-of-the-circumstances test,
weighing Samson’s privacy interests against the government’s interest in

131. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE §
3067(a) (West 2000)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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reducing recidivism by parolees.140 Significantly, the Court determined that
on the “continuum” of persons with privacy interests, parolees “have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers.”141 According to the Court, “‘The
essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence,
on the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules during the balance
of the sentence.’”142 The Court noted the many conditions routinely
imposed on parolees as further evidence that parolees “have severely
diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”143 The
Court also considered it relevant that the California law, under which
Samson was paroled, required Samson to submit to suspicionless searches
and that this requirement was “clearly expressed” to Samson in the order he
signed to gain release.144 The Court concluded: “Examining the totality of
the circumstances pertaining to [Samson]’s status as a parolee, ‘an
established variation on imprisonment,’ . . . including the plain terms of the
parole search condition, we conclude that [Samson] did not have an
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”145
As in Knights, however, the Court did not decide whether Samson
waived his Fourth Amendment rights and/or consented to the Fourth
Amendment search of his person when he signed the order acknowledging
that release on parole would be accompanied by the potential for such
warrantless, suspicionless searches.146 On this point, the Court explained:
“Because we find that the search at issue here is reasonable under our
Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach the issue whether
‘acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth [v.
Bustamonte] sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.’”147
Thus, while the Supreme Court has twice considered a post-conviction
person’s “consent” to warrantless, suspicionless searches of person and
home to be one factor of Fourth Amendment reasonableness,148 the Court
has never decided whether a convicted person, let alone a pretrial arrestee,

140. Id. at 2196–97; see also supra note 70 (discussing the totality-of-the-circumstances test).
141. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2194; see id. at 2198 (“[P]arole is more akin to imprisonment than
probation is to imprisonment.”).
142. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)).
143. Id. at 2199 (noting that typical parole conditions include: mandatory drug tests,
restrictions on associating with felons, mandatory meetings with parole officers, restrictions on
weapon possession and travel, and tailored conditions for some parolees that can include
psychiatric treatment and/or abstinence from alcohol).
144. Id.
145. Id. (citation omitted).
146. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199 n.3.
147. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118
(2001)). Likewise, the Court avoided a “special needs” Griffin-type analysis of the issue, finding
such analysis unnecessary where the typical Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances
evaluation revealed the search to be constitutionally reasonable. Id.
148. See supra Part I.C.2–3.
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“consents” to waive her Fourth Amendment rights by signing a form saying
that she does.
D. POST-CONVICTION BLANKET FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS
AND THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit to have
faced the pretrial Fourth Amendment consent issue,149 other circuits have
considered post-conviction waivers with differing results. Last year, the
Seventh Circuit upheld “a blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as a
condition of probation” in United States v. Barnett.150 There, a criminal
defendant pleaded guilty to a gun charge and then appealed, arguing that
his earlier motion to suppress had been wrongly denied by the trial court.151
Before facing the federal gun charge, Barnett had been convicted in a state
court and sentenced to “intensive” probation, rather than incarceration.152
Among other conditions of his intensive probation, Barnett was required to
“‘submit to searches of [his] person, residence, papers, automobile and/or
effects at any time such requests are made by the Probation Officer, and
consent to the use of anything seized as evidence in Court proceedings.’”153
Pursuant to the search condition of Barnett’s intensive probation, the
government searched Barnett’s home without a warrant (and arguably
without reasonable suspicion to suspect that he was violating his intensive
probation).154 The Seventh Circuit upheld the warrantless search as
compatible with the Fourth Amendment and affirmed Barnett’s conviction,
noting that “[c]onstitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided
that the waiver is knowing and intelligent, as it was here.”155 Essentially, the
Seventh Circuit relied on common, contract-type principles of bargained-for
offer and acceptance to find that Barnett had waived his Fourth Amendment
rights when he avoided incarceration by negotiating his release on intensive
probation.156 The court explained:

149. At least two states have decided the issue. See In re York, 892 P.2d 804, 814 (Cal. 1995)
(rejecting the idea that an arrested person who seeks release has the same reasonable
expectation of privacy as someone who has posted reasonable bail and holding that persons
unable to post reasonable bail may be required to consent to warrantless searches and seizures
to gain release); State v. Ullring, 741 A.2d 1065, 1068 (Me. 1999) (holding that the mere fact
that an arrestee is incarcerated when he decides to consent to waive his Fourth Amendment
rights as part of pretrial release does not invalidate the consent).
150. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 691.
152. Id.
153. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting terms of probation).
154. Id. at 693.
155. Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691.
156. Id. at 693. In fact, the Barnett court compared the probation agreement to a “contract”
involved in plea bargains. Id. “Plea bargains are a form of contract . . . and like other contracts

WILSON_PP_TO_ILR

182

11/14/2006 2:21:06 PM

92 IOWA LAW REVIEW

[2006]

Barnett didn’t want to go to prison. He preferred to sacrifice the
limited privacy to which he would have been entitled had he been
on ordinary as distinct from intensive probation . . . just as
convicted defendants prefer home confinement to confinement in
a jail or prison even if the home confinement involves monitoring
the defendant’s activities inside the home and thus invades his
privacy. And since imprisonment is a greater invasion of personal
privacy than being exposed to searches of one’s home on demand,
the bargain that Barnett struck was not only advantageous to him
but actually more protective of Fourth Amendment values than the
alternative of prison would have been.157
Applying an analysis akin to the analysis that the Seventh Circuit used in
Barnett, the Sixth Circuit has also upheld a criminal defendant’s consent to a
blanket search in the context of post-conviction probation.158 In United States
v. Downs,159 a defendant signed a probation agreement acknowledging:
“‘In consideration of having been granted supervision on 9-15-94, I
agree . . . to the following conditions: . . . I agree to a search
without warrant of my person, my motor vehicle, or my place of
residence by a probation/parole officer at any time . . . . I have
read or had read to me, the foregoing conditions of my probation.
I fully understand these conditions. I agree to comply with them,
and I understand that violation of any of these conditions may
result in the revocation of my probation.’”160
Based on the defendant’s execution of this probation agreement, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s probation officer was
constitutionally authorized to search the defendant’s home based on
reasonable suspicion, as opposed to probable cause, that the defendant was
violating his probation.161 The court noted that “the waiver of a
constitutional right such as this one must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.”162 In evaluating the knowing and intelligent nature of Downs’s
valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, the Sixth Circuit found the
terms of the condition “readily understandable” and stated that the writing
put the defendant/probationer on notice that his home might be the

are presumed to make both parties better off and do no harm to third parties, and so they are
enforceable and enforced.” Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 691–92.
158. See generally United States v. Downs, No. 96-3862, 1999 WL 130786 (6th Cir. Jan. 19,
1999) (unpublished opinion).
159. Id.
160. Id. at *2 (quoting Downs’s conditions of supervision).
161. Id. at *4.
162. Id. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
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subject of a warrantless search.163 Thus, the Sixth Circuit panel concluded
that “[the defendant’s] waiver of his Fourth Amendment protection was
knowing and intelligent.”164
As for the voluntariness of relinquishing his rights, the court quickly
concluded with only superficial analysis that Downs had signed his probation
agreement voluntarily.165 Although the court acknowledged that Downs
“lacked an attractive option when making his choice to waive his Fourth
Amendment protections,”166 the court also found that “having to decide
between probation with a waiver of some rights or incarceration does not
negate the voluntariness of the choice.”167 The Sixth Circuit concluded: “In
light of the policies and case law supporting diminished Fourth Amendment
freedoms for probationers and Downs’s consent to warrantless searches in
his supervision agreement, we find no error in the district court’s denial of
Downs’s motion to suppress.”168
In addition to the offer and acceptance contract-type analysis applied by
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in validating a probationer’s blanket waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights, the Second Circuit has evaluated such probation
waivers using a special-needs analysis. In United States v. Lifshitz,169 the Second
Circuit expressed a general willingness to uphold warrantless searches of
probationers without probable cause, although it was equally concerned
with restricting such searches to specific law-enforcement needs.170 The
court in Lifshitz reviewed a computer-monitoring condition imposed on a
probationer who had been convicted of receiving child pornography over
the Internet.171 The sentencing court in Lifshitz had granted the defendant a
ten-level downward departure172 from the recommended sentencing-

163. Downs, 1999 WL 130786, at *4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *4 n.2.
167. Id.
168. Downs, 1999 WL 130786, at *4.
169. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
170. Id. at 185–86.
171. Id. at 175–76.
172. In imposing sentences in federal court, sentencing judges are guided by the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (2005)
[hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL], available at http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf. The
Sentencing Guidelines were created as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”). 18
U.S.C. § 3551 (2000); see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 550 (2000) (explaining that the
SRA created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “which in turn promulgated the [Federal]
Sentencing Guidelines”). The SRA was passed in an effort to end the uncertainties and
disparities that had accompanied the indeterminate-sentencing system that predated the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1989). The
sentencing guidelines now provide an advisory range of punishments that a court may impose
on a particular defendant. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)
(making the sentencing guidelines merely advisory); GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra. The range is
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guideline range and had placed the defendant on probation with
conditions.173 One of the conditions, a rigid computer-monitoring
restriction, prompted Lifshitz to appeal.174 The contested condition
provided:
“‘[T]he defendant shall consent to the installation of systems that
will enable the Probation office or its designee to monitor and
filter computer use on a regular or random basis and any computer
owned or controlled by the defendant. The defendant shall
consent to unannounced examinations of any computer
equipment owned or controlled by the defendant which may result
in the retrieval and copying of all data from the computer and any
internal or external peripherals and may involve removal of such
equipment for the purpose of conducting a more thorough
investigation.’”175
In evaluating the search conditions imposed on Lifshitz, the Second
Circuit articulated a general acceptance of some warrantless searches of
probationers but voiced an even stronger desire to limit the scope of such
searches.176 As the court put it: “[T]he search program at issue must seek a
minimum of intrusiveness coupled with maximal effectiveness so that the
searches ‘bear a close and substantial relationship’ to the government’s
‘special needs.’”177 Thus, the Second Circuit viewed the pertinent issue as
“whether the computer monitoring condition imposed upon Lifshitz
constitutes such a ‘more focused restriction,’ or does itself result in a
deprivation of privacy ‘greater . . . than reasonably necessary.’”178
Unlike the Seventh Circuit that insisted on holding a probationer to the
bargain he struck with the government, the Second Circuit seemed
unconcerned that Lifshitz had agreed to concede some of his Fourth

designed to reflect the severity of the crime committed, the defendant’s criminal history, and
other circumstances relevant to the particular offense and offender. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
The guidelines result in a mathematical-type calculation of suggested sentences, using a grid in
which a defendant is assigned an offense level and a criminal-history category. See generally
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra, at app. G (providing the Sentencing Table). In Lifshitz, the
sentencing judge deviated by ten levels and/or categories from the applicable guideline range,
thereby significantly reducing the range of punishment that Lifshitz would have been expected
to receive if the guidelines had been more strictly adhered to. Liftshitz, 369 F.3d at 177.
173. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 177.
174. Id. at 175.
175. Id. at 177 (alteration in original) (quoting the computer-monitoring restriction).
176. Id. at 185–86.
177. Id. at 186.
178. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 189 (alteration in original); see also id. at 190 (stating that a court
“must assess the necessary scope of the monitoring condition in light of the ‘special needs’
articulated in this particular case, those of rehabilitating Lifshitz and ensuring that he does not
inflict further harm on the community by receiving or disseminating child pornography during
the probationary period”).
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Amendment protections as a means of avoiding incarceration. Implicitly, the
Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit in Scott, focused on what the totality of
the circumstances dictated was reasonable. The Second Circuit remanded
the case to the district court with directions that the trial court further
evaluate the “privacy implications” of the proposed computer-monitoring
techniques it had previously imposed as a term of Lifshitz’s probation.179
In sum, the handful of federal circuit courts that have confronted the
“consent” issue have struggled in deciding whether post-conviction
probationers can validly waive their Fourth Amendment rights as a
condition of release from incarceration and, if so, how extensive such
waivers can and/or should be. The variations in the courts’ reasoning and
conclusions regarding convicted criminals highlight the constitutional
tension and difficult legal issues presented when someone awaiting trial is
asked to waive his Fourth Amendment rights to gain pretrial liberty.
There are constitutional and pragmatic reasons why the law should treat
convicted persons differently than it treats charged persons. The most
important, of course, is that an arrested person may be innocent. An obvious
basis for a criminal defendant’s constitutional guarantees to legal counsel,
confrontation, trial by jury, and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof at trial is society’s desire to ensure that innocent persons are not
convicted and punished. The basic rationales underlying the punishment of
convicted criminals—utilitarianism180 and retributivism181—are ineffective
unless the defendant is guilty. Furthermore, it is unconstitutional for the
government to punish someone who has not been convicted of a crime.182
Because the federal courts have not uniformly decided that convicted
criminals may unconditionally waive their Fourth Amendment rights to gain
post-conviction liberty, there is even less reason to believe that there will be
judicial agreement on waivers in the pretrial context.

179. Id. at 193.
180. Utilitarianism presumes that criminal laws will “maximize the net happiness of society”
but also rests on the notion that happiness will be maximized only when inflicting punishment
is necessary to reduce “the pain of crime that would occur otherwise.” JOSHUA DRESSLER &
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 1215
(2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter DRESSLER & THOMAS]. Utilitarianism would never support
punishment of the innocent. See generally id. For instance, deterrence, which is a utilitarian goal,
remains unserved when the innocent are punished. Id.
181. “Retributivists believe that punishment is justified when it is deserved.” Id. at 1216.
Naturally, someone innocent of a charged crime does not deserve punishment. Furthermore,
there is no rational reason to ask him to relinquish his rights and privileges.
182. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16, 536–37 (1979); see supra Part I.C.1 (discussing
Bell); see also Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that a pretrial
detainee has not been adjudged guilty of any crime and may not be punished, cruelly,
unusually, or otherwise, but acknowledging that not every uncomfortable condition or
restriction is punitive); O’Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (indicating that
punishment of pretrial detainee, except for violations of “order and security” administration
regulations, is unconstitutional).
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II. PRETRIAL RELEASE CONDITIONED ON A FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER
SHOULD BE PERMITTED
A. THE DILEMMA
Can an arrested person who faces pretrial detention validly and freely
waive his or her rights in exchange for release from jail?183 The decision in
United States v. Scott exposes the constitutional tension that results when an
arrested person seeks to strike a bargain with the government to gain the
freedoms associated with pretrial release from jail.184 The stress of an
arrest185 and the pressures that necessarily accompany making a choice
between two undesirables, jail and waiver of one’s Fourth Amendment
rights, can reach a coercive level.186 The Ninth Circuit captured the essence
of these pressures in its decision in the Scott case. As the court noted there,
Scott “was given the choice to waive his Fourth Amendment rights or stay in
jail.”187
Some legal scholars would undoubtedly argue that such a choice is no
choice at all.188 As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “Many pretrial detainees
willingly consent to such conditions, preferring to give up some rights in
order to sleep in their own beds while awaiting trial.”189 On the other hand,
without such an option to use some rights as a bargaining tool, Scott and
others like him could remain in jail indefinitely.190 Thus, a decision to waive
183. In United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006), the majority drew a distinction
between a criminal defendant’s ability to waive his Fourth Amendment rights, which the court
believed defendants could do, and the government’s power to “induce” a pretrial defendant “to
waive his Fourth Amendment rights by conditioning pretrial release on such a waiver.” Id. at
865 n.4. I think the distinction is more semantic than substantive. When an arrestee waives his
Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for release from incarceration pending trial, it makes
no difference to him whether he offers his rights in exchange for release or whether the
government seeks to induce him to forego these rights. Id. at 887 n.7 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“In
one sense, the government has no more ‘induced’ Scott to forgo his Fourth Amendment rights
in exchange for his liberty, than Scott has ‘induced’ the government to forgo its right to require
bail in exchange for the right to search him at his home.”).
184. Id. at 865 (majority opinion).
185. “An arrest . . . is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is
guilty or innocent.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
186. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (noting the potential for compulsion
when a person is arrested, “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere,” and subjected to “menacing
police interrogation procedures”).
187. Scott, 450 F.3d at 866.
188. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Testing for Evidence of
Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1195 (1990) (asserting that “it is pure fiction” to
conclude that a probationer’s agreement to submit to a search and seizure condition is not
coerced given that a defendant must choose between freedom and incarceration).
189. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865–66.
190. The Bail Reform Act contains no time limits on detention. Bail Reform Act of 1984 §
203, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2000). Of course, speedy-trial deadlines would provide some outside
limits on the indefinite nature of the detention, given that the pretrial detainee is held only
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Fourth Amendment rights arguably only increases the opportunities,
options, rights, and liberties available to persons, like Scott, who are charged
with a crime. “After all, Scott’s options were only expanded when he was
given the choice to waive his Fourth Amendment rights or stay in jail.”191
Is an arrested person who faces the real likelihood of indefinite, pretrial
detention pressed to waive his constitutional rights? Of course he is. It defies
common sense to say that such a decision is, in fact, a “free and
unconstrained choice”192 in the sense that the arrested person feels no
urgency to subordinate his Fourth Amendment rights. Certainly, if such a
defendant lacks the property, money, or other means needed to secure his
release from jail, there is little doubt that he will almost always “decide” to
waive his Fourth Amendment rights (and any others necessary)193 to gain
freedom from detention. Detention, after all, is a place where an arrested
person has even fewer rights and liberties. If an arrestee waives his Fourth
Amendment rights, he immediately gains the opportunity, among other
freedoms, to sleep in his own bed, choose his own meals, and move about
beyond bars. Because the attraction of these comforts is so great, the only
time a pretrial defendant is likely to choose to preserve his Fourth
Amendment rights and accept detention is when he knows that his home or
belongings currently contain incriminating evidence. In that instance, the
pressure might be greatest to accept pretrial detention to protect the
adverse evidence from the reach of the police.194
In addition to the perils to liberty and privacy that individuals face when
asked to trade their Fourth Amendment rights for their freedom, there are
obvious dangers to society that accompany an arrestee’s blanket Fourth
until trial. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. In addition, arrested persons with property
and other assets might gain release by posting bail. See Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c)(1)(xi) (including as a possible condition of pretrial release that the arrested person
execute an agreement to forfeit property used as collateral upon failing to appear as required);
id. § 3142(c)(1)(xii) (including as a possible condition of pretrial release that the arrested
person “execute a bail bond with solvent sureties”); see also Scott, 450 F.3d at 889 (Bybee, J.,
dissenting) (“It is not hard to imagine that some jurisdictions will decide that releasing persons
accused of crimes on OR without such conditions will not serve the public interest.”).
191. Scott, 450 F.3d at 866.
192. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); see also infra Part II.B–C
(discussing Schneckloth).
193. Perhaps this is really the problem. Where will the waivers stop? Once the government
knows that it can “urge” a defendant to waive Fourth Amendment rights in the pretrial context,
there is little to stop the government from obtaining a waiver of many other constitutional
and/or statutory rights, whether or not the waivers correlate directly with risk of flight or
danger to the community. For instance, why wouldn’t the government demand that the arrestee
waive his right to file a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence, or any other right that,
when waived, would benefit the government?
194. Because a convicted defendant receives credit for time he spends in pretrial detention,
a defendant who expects a conviction may also prefer to remain in jail before trial rather than
forego his Fourth Amendment rights, especially if serving time is, for whatever reason, more
convenient before trial than it would be after a conviction.
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Amendment waiver.195 “Pervasively imposing an intrusive search regime as
the price of pretrial release, just like imposing such a regime outright, can
contribute to the downward ratchet of privacy expectations.”196 “When an
individual waives her Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for a
government benefit or relief from some penalty, the waiver may implicate
substantial public values.”197 The Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable government searches and seizures guards all people from
“government repression by subjecting governmental searches to scrutiny and
review.”198 In other words, the Fourth Amendment protects the individual,
but it also requires that government searches be “consistent with societal
expectations of privacy.”199 In this way, the public values of security and
privacy are protected.200
Regardless of the risks to individuals and a “free” society, the real issue
in the pretrial, bail-hearing context is whether the pressure that necessarily
accompanies the “choice” between two negative situations invalidates the
choice altogether. It may be that a criminal defendant, in fact, prefers to
waive one constitutional right to keep the ability to exercise others. The
tougher, related issue is whether a defendant should be put to such a choice.
Is it appropriate to allow and/or require a person who faces criminal
charges, but who has not yet been deemed guilty, to select between rights?
On the other hand, does an accused person not have the right or ability to
exercise his own volition to remove himself from the potentially abhorrent
possibility of indefinite pretrial confinement?201 Life is replete with difficult
choices, but difficulty alone does not always render a choice legally invalid.202
195. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 867–69 (2003) (citing
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 67–68 (1998)).
196. Scott, 450 F.3d at 867; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourth Amendment acts as “a bulwark against police practices
that prevail in totalitarian regimes”).
197. Mazzone, supra note 195, at 868.
198. Id. at 868 & n.321 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
(recognizing society’s interest in a living environment in which persons are reasonably free
from surveillance)).
199. Id. at 868 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984)).
200. Id.
201. The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that under our system of
government, the people retain certain basic rights, even when the rights are not specifically
mentioned in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 210–11 (1973) (noting
various privacy and liberty rights retained by the people, including freedom of choice in the
basic decisions of one’s life); see also Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who
Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Disclosure of Collective Responsibility,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 695 n.11 (2006) (describing the right to self-representation as one of the
best expressions of the law’s respect for an individual’s autonomy to control his own criminal
case).
202. At least one legal writer has urged that a probationer’s consent to a blanket search is
voluntary. See Marc R. Lewis, Lost in Probation: Contrasting the Treatment of Probationary Search
Agreements in California and Federal Courts, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1731 (2004) (“A probationer’s
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B. WAIVERS CAN BE CONSENSUAL
Suspects in criminal investigations commonly consent to forego their
Fourth Amendment rights.203 In fact, criminal cases are full of examples of
“voluntary” Fourth Amendment consent searches. Usually, a suspect “agrees”
to a search of her person, car, or home without legal counsel and without
the benefit of an unbiased judge who might ensure that the suspect
consented under conditions that were fair and that she was not tricked or
pressured into giving permission to search. Such searches routinely uncover
contraband. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte presents a typical situation.204 There, a
police officer stopped a car after he noticed a headlight and a license-plate
light burned out.205 The officer pulled the car over and asked one of the
passengers in the front seat if the officer could search the car.206 The
passenger said, “Sure, go ahead.”207 The search uncovered evidence of a
crime.208 The search in Schneckloth was deemed valid, even though the
consenting person was not told that he had the right to refuse consent, even
though he had no lawyer to consult, and notwithstanding that there was no
neutral magistrate judge present to ensure that the passenger understood
his rights.209 As a practical matter, suspects do not act voluntarily and in the
advance waiver of Fourth Amendment protection is more likely to be knowing and intelligent
than a criminal suspect’s consent to search . . . .”). Although a probationer is already convicted
and a potential pretrial detainee only charged, much of Lewis’s reasoning also applies to the
pretrial-waiver context. As Lewis notes: “When a probationer waives her Fourth Amendment
rights, defense counsel is present to provide advice, and the proceeding itself is conducted by a
neutral judicial official.” Id. The same is true when an arrested person agrees to a blanket
Fourth Amendment search waiver. But see Rosen, supra note 188, at 1195 (advancing the idea
that it is “pure fiction” that a probationer’s consent to a search-and-seizure condition is
voluntary).
203. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Nothing is more common
than an individual’s consenting to a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth
Amendment, thinking that he will be better off than he would be standing on his rights.”); see
also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent
Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (“Over 90% of warrantless police searches are
accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.”); Williams,
supra note 201, at 702 (noting the common-place nature of the waiver of constitutional rights
and asserting that the right to waive is “a right in itself, one among the positive constitutional
rights associated with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments”).
204. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 197–200 (2002) (holding that bus passengers’ consent to search their persons was
“voluntary” as required by the Fourth Amendment, even though three officers entered the bus
without probable cause, one knelt on the bus driver’s seat at the front of the bus, one stationed
himself at the back of the bus, and a third worked his way methodically through the bus, asking
questions of passengers and then, without telling the passengers that they had a right to refuse,
asked Drayton and his companion for permission to search their luggage and person).
205. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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absence of coercion when they “consent” to such searches; yet, the searches
are conducted by law-enforcement officers, and courts routinely approve
them.210
Logically, it is difficult to say that someone with little understanding of
the law and no legal advisor can voluntarily “consent” to a search of his car
or home, but that a pretrial detainee, who has usually been Mirandized211
and who has the advice of counsel and the benefit of a neutral arbiter,
should be prohibited from entering into an agreement “waiving” her Fourth
Amendment rights. A person facing pretrial detention should arguably have
less constitutional protection than a person who is not facing such
confinement because he has had “a ‘judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following
arrest.’”212 If the arrestee is truly in danger of detention, he is also entitled to
a detention hearing.213 If a pretrial detainee were simply treated like an
ordinary citizen, uncounseled consent to conduct a search would be wholly
adequate. Arrestees should not enjoy more constitutional protections than
those citizens not reasonably suspected of committing crimes; therefore,
arrestees should, at least under some circumstances, be permitted to “agree”
to such Fourth Amendment searches.214
The legal sustainability of a pretrial detainee’s rights waiver (at least
under the right precautionary circumstances) is most readily supported by
the analogous setting in which an accused person waives his constitutional
rights and pleads guilty to criminal charges. After all, waiving Fourth
Amendment rights to avoid the indignities of an extended stay in jail can
hardly be more coercive than entering a plea of guilty and foregoing all of
the constitutional rights that accompany a jury trial. In fact, the Supreme
Court has found that even if a person’s plea of guilty rests, at least in part, on
his fear of the death penalty, such a plea is valid, provided the defendant is

210. See Simmons, supra note 203, at 779 (contending that in practice the courts “only look
to the conduct of the police,” not the characteristics or volition of the suspect when
determining if consent is voluntary); see also id. at 797 (arguing that in the Fourth Amendment
context, “the focus is on the reasonableness of the actions of the law enforcement official, not
the subjective consent of the individual being searched”).
211. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring that persons subjected to
in-custody interrogation be advised of certain rights, including the right to remain silent and
the right to legal counsel).
212. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
213. Id. (citation omitted).
214. One obvious difference between an arrestee and an average citizen who consents to a
search is that an arrested person is not consenting to a specific, one-time search. She is
providing an open-ended consent to potentially numerous searches at the whim of the
government searcher.
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represented by counsel, the plea complies with the mandates of Rule 11,215
and the record reflects that the plea was entered understandingly and
voluntarily.216 A fortiari, Fourth Amendment rights waivers, which are
necessarily accompanied by less compulsion, are legally supportable.
Like plea bargains, which courts have treated as a form of contract,217
any bargain reached between the government and an arrested person who
faces a risk of detention is nothing more than a contract “presumed to make
both parties better off and [to] do no harm to third parties”218 Applying
basic contract principles, such waiver agreements are enforceable.219 Like
other contracts, “[i]f a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an
improper threat . . . the contract [would be] voidable by the victim.”220
If the federal courts validate post-arrest, pretrial Fourth Amendment
waivers, arrested persons will undoubtedly feel pressure to forego their
rights in favor of pretrial liberty. Nevertheless, an arrested person is afforded
numerous protections from unfair dealing that are unavailable to the
average citizen who may also be asked to consent to a Fourth Amendment
search during a criminal investigation.221 Persons facing pretrial detention
benefit from legal counsel and a neutral arbiter who can assist them in

215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (requiring the trial court to address the defendant personally in
open court and to inform the defendant of his rights so that it is clear that the defendant’s plea
is really voluntary and grounded on a factual basis).
216. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746–47 & n.4 (1970). The Supreme Court
announced in dicta that the government “may not produce a plea by actual or threatened
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.” Id. at 750. The
Court also held open the possibility that a criminal defendant would be “so gripped by fear of
the death penalty [(a possible consequence of not pleading guilty)] or hope of leniency that he
did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial
against the advantages of pleading guilty.” Id.; see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31
(1970) (finding that a defendant who would not have pled guilty except for an opportunity to
limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that plea was not a product of free
and rational choice).
217. See United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that plea
bargains are like contracts and should be interpreted in accordance with the parties’
intentions); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); see also
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”).
218. Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692.
219. Id.
220. 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:8 (4th ed. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1979)).
221. Contrast the “voluntary” consent to search given in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 232–33 (1973), which was valid, although the defendant was not accompanied by counsel,
was unaware of his right to refuse consent, and was never told of a right against selfincrimination, with the numerous protections afforded an arrested person under the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2000), including the right to counsel and to a
hearing before a judge.
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evaluating the pros and cons of such a waiver.222 The law deems such
procedural safeguards sufficient to ensure the voluntary nature of guilty
pleas, all of which result in the loss of fundamental rights.223 Therefore, the
law should also respect a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in the postarrest, pretrial context. The procedural protections that attach to pretrialdetention hearings224 will tend to confirm that an arrestee’s decision to waive
his or her Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for pretrial release is
knowing, understanding, and voluntary (both as a legal matter and in the
way that a normal person would expect someone to make a difficult choice).
The arrestee’s own lawyer will be present to protect the arrestee’s interests
and ensure her understanding of the process and any Fourth Amendment
waiver. The magistrate judge will be present to determine from a more
neutral position whether such a waiver is part of the least-restrictive means
necessary to ensure that the arrestee will appear at trial and avoid criminal
conduct in the meantime.
C. BLANKET WAIVERS SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY AND KNOWING
Assuming for the moment that a pretrial arrestee can consent to “waive”
his Fourth Amendment rights, by what standard should such a “consent” or
“waiver” be judged? The Supreme Court has stated that “one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”225 Thus, a
warrantless search, even of someone’s home (where privacy is at its zenith),
is permissible when the homeowner consents.226 Of course, the government
always bears the burden of proving that consent is “in fact, freely and
voluntarily given.”227 And whether consent is really voluntary is a “question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”228
In the context of a noncustodial consent search of a car, the Supreme
Court has defined a voluntary consent as “an essentially free and

222. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
223. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (upholding a guilty plea in face of
plaintiff’s claim that it was not sufficiently voluntary because it was entered to avoid a potential
death sentence).
224. These protections include: (1) a proceeding during which the judge hears evidence
and arguments from the government and the defendant regarding the appropriate pretrial
restraints to impose on the arrestee, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); (2) representation by counsel
(appointed or retained) to personally advise the arrestee, id.; (3) an opportunity to testify,
present witnesses, and/or proffer information, id.; (4) the right to have the terms of her release
explained in writing by the judicial officer, id. § 3142(h)(1); (5) the right to be advised of the
consequences of violating the conditions of release, id. § 3142(h)(2)(B); and (6) the protection
of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for detention, id. § 3142(f).
225. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219.
226. Id. at 222.
227. Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).
228. Id. at 227.
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unconstrained choice by its maker” as compared to a choice made when a
person’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.”229 According to the Court, consent must not be
“coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.”230
The Supreme Court requires an even stronger showing of voluntariness
when a criminal defendant agrees to relinquish constitutional rights
designed to preserve a fair trial.231 To ensure a criminal defendant’s fair-trial
process, the Court mandates that a waiver of constitutional rights be
knowing in addition to voluntary. Such waivers must be undertaken with
“sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”232 The Court has explained that “whether a person has acted
‘voluntarily’ is quite distinct from the question whether he has ‘waived’ a
trial right.”233 While the former question asks if the person has been
coerced, the latter question turns on the extent of the person’s
knowledge.234 “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of [a constitutional trial right] must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”235 Thus, the
government is held to a higher standard of voluntariness in the trial context
than in the investigatory phase of a case.236 For example, guilty pleas are
“carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused knew and
understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and that he
had intentionally chosen to forego them.”237 In contrast, a person may
consent to a search of his home or car, provided his consent is voluntary.
Although no published decision directly assesses the standard
applicable to a pretrial Fourth Amendment blanket waiver, in the postconviction phase, the circuit courts have applied the tougher trial-waiver
standard.238 In reviewing a criminal defendant’s post-conviction “consent” to
229. Id. at 225 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
230. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. Nevertheless, the consenting person need not be told that
she has the right to refuse consent. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002).
231. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237.
232. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938). Zerbst dealt with the potential waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Id. at 458.
233. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238.
234. Id.
235. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
236. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236–37.
237. Id. at 238; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (providing that a defendant must demonstrate to
the court that he understands his rights before a guilty plea will be accepted); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (noting
that guilty pleas are valid, as long as they are both voluntary and intelligent)).
238. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Downs,
No. 96-3862, 1999 WL 130786, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan 19, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (applying a
“knowing and intelligent” standard to a probationer’s blanket Fourth Amendment waiver).
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a waiver as part of probation, the Seventh Circuit has noted that
“[c]onstitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that the
waiver is knowing and intelligent.”239 The Sixth Circuit has also applied the
stricter standard.240
From a due-process and fairness standpoint, it is best to afford arrested
persons all of the constitutional protections that accompany trial rights,
including the more stringent “waiver” procedural safeguards. After all, “The
guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also protect him at certain
stages before the actual trial, and any alleged waiver must meet the strict
standard of an intentional relinquishment of a ‘known’ right.”241 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he trial which might determine
the accused’s fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the
pretrial confrontation, with the State aligned against the accused . . . and
the accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or
unintentional . . . .”242 Although in some instances a bond determination
may not directly affect a criminal defendant’s trial, the fact that a defendant
may sit in jail while awaiting that day in court can alter the pace with which a
defendant’s lawyer moves toward trial and the strategies she employs to
reach trial sooner rather than later. Furthermore, someone detained has a
limited ability to prepare his defense. When detained, a defendant has
restricted contact with his lawyer and even less access to potential trial
witnesses.243 These limits on a criminal defendant’s ability to investigate and
prepare her defense properly can have a meaningful and detrimental effect
on her ability to present fully her side of the story to a jury. Because the
judge’s decision to detain an arrested person has the capacity to alter her
ability to prepare her case for trial and, thereby, impair a defendant’s fairtrial process, pretrial waivers used to gain pretrial freedom are important.244
Arrestees, therefore, deserve the same procedural protections afforded to
trial waivers of similar rights.245

239. Barnett, 415 F.3d at 691.
240. Downs, 1999 WL 130786, at *4.
241. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 239.
242. Id. at 239–40.
243. See DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 180, at 747; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951) (acknowledging that detention may limit a defendant’s preparation for trial by limiting
her access to her attorney and potential witnesses); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End
of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 124 (2005) (explaining how
detention limits a defendant’s ability to prepare for trial and often results in conviction).
244. In fact, criminal defendants who remain in detention before trial are anxious for
resolution; therefore, they plead guilty more often than those who are released while awaiting
adjudication of their case. See Wright, supra note 243, at 124.
245. Scholars contend that defendants who are unable to make bail are “‘for that reason
alone, more likely to be convicted’” regardless of the seriousness of the offense. See DRESSLER &
THOMAS, supra note 180, at 747 (quoting Hans Zeisel, Bail Revisited, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
769, 769).
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Moreover, as discussed in Part II.A, someone confronted with pretrial
detention is under strong pressure to waive any rights that can be exchanged
for pretrial release. An arrestee may face a real possibility of the loss of
liberty and privacy without the protection of a guilt-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard. While such pressure can fall short of the stress produced
during a custodial interrogation without counsel,246 the situation is much
more akin to a trial setting than to the typical, investigative search
environment. The arrested person is in custody, on unfamiliar turf, with
potentially few options to secure his discharge. Additionally, the arrestee is
faced with a genuine likelihood of jail, which will expose him to numerous
indignities, potentially including strip searches, group housing, common
bathroom facilities, restrictions on phone privileges and reading materials,
and a host of other infringements on his privacy. Understandably, one might
feel intense pressure to forego Fourth Amendment rights to gain the
additional freedoms associated with home. In short, the more accusedfriendly standard, which would require a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of one’s Fourth Amendment rights, is the appropriate standard for a
judge to use in cases where an accused must choose between incarceration
and waiving such rights.
D. THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONSENT
Who should determine whether someone facing detention should go to
jail and relinquish almost all privacy and liberty rights or forego a portion of
her Fourth Amendment protections to avoid those indignities? The person
who risks the deprivation of liberty and privacy should be allowed to make
his own decision. After all, “[o]ften a big part of the value of a right is what
one can get in exchange for giving it up.”247 Who better to value this
exchange than those facing the loss of rights? Arguably, those presumed
innocent of the charges they face have an innate, if not a constitutional,
right to give up some freedoms to avoid the intrusive nature of
incarceration.248 A person should not be “‘imprison[ed] . . . in his
privileges.’”249 Incarceration, even before trial, routinely means common

246. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 115–16 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.’” (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461)).
247. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
248. See supra note 201 and accompanying text; see also Marc M. Harrold, Computer Searches
of Probationers—Diminished Privacies, “Special Needs” & “‘Whilst’ Quiet Pedophiles”—Plugging the
Fourth Amendment into the “Virtual Home Visit,” 75 MISS. L.J. 273, 293 (2005) (asserting that
“implicit and intrinsic in the grant of any ‘right’” is an individual’s power to waive it).
249. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)) (addressing issues surrounding the use of a defendant’s
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bathrooms and sleeping quarters, limited choices in food and reading
materials, restricted phone privileges, potentially recorded conversations,
limited exercise, restrictions on visitors, and, of course, physical
confinement.250 If someone merely charged with a crime must face such
privacy and liberty infringements, he alone should decide whether he would
be better off subjecting himself to unannounced searches, with or without
probable cause, to avoid incarceration.
The ability of arrested persons to bargain away some or all of their
Fourth Amendment rights to gain release from pretrial detention will prove
especially important to indigent defendants who have little or no money or
property to offer as collateral. With the ability to relinquish some of their
Fourth Amendment rights, indigent defendants would gain an additional
bargaining tool to obtain their release from jail. Nevertheless, the ability to
sign away Fourth Amendment rights, unless strictly limited, opens the door
for the government to abuse its power to exact such waivers. This is
especially true in the case of indigent defendants, who might always be
required to forego their constitutional rights in exchange for pretrial
release.
Even from a paternalistic perspective, it seems better to protect the
indigent defendants—the ones who will be most susceptible to jail because
they have no money or means to use as collateral to ensure their
appearance. That is, it makes sense to guard indigents from losing so many
of their privacy rights while, at the same time, protecting society from
ongoing criminal activity, by allowing a magistrate judge to weigh all of the
pertinent factors and decide when the reasons for waiver outweigh the
interests in holding the arrested person in jail.251 At the same time, a cynic
should be willing to allow a defendant to waive some Fourth Amendment
rights as a temporary stop-gap measure, because a cynic would say that the
criminal facing trial will inevitably return to his criminal activity. Under a
cynic’s view, a continuing criminal enterprise will be revealed during the
“compliance inspections” that accompany a criminal’s conditional release
from detention.252 Thus, like consent searches that are encouraged by
society because “the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the
solution and prosecution of crime, [or] evidence that may insure that a

post-Miranda, inculpatory statement that followed the defendant’s invocation of his right to
remain silent).
250. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that detainees
are not unlawfully punished when subjected to telephone restrictions, denial of visitations, and
limited use of showers and sheets for three days).
251. See Harrold, supra note 248, at 294–98 n.52 (2005) (criticizing commentators’
condemnation of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court upholds a person’s autonomy to
consent to a Fourth Amendment search conducted “on the street”).
252. On the negative side, a defendant released from detention may engage in some
criminal activity before additional investigation and relevant searches reveal such crimes.
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wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense,”253
waivers of a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights should be allowed, if not
encouraged. Such waivers give defendants more freedom, while providing
law enforcement additional tools to investigate.254
III. IF FOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS ARE PERMITTED,
THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM IS EQUIPPED WITH
ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT THEM EFFECTIVELY
It is tempting, at first, to focus solely on the coercive versus free-choice
aspect of the issue of whether an arrested person can freely and voluntarily
waive her Fourth Amendment rights and/or be induced by the government
to do so. On closer review, it seems more likely that the answer to the freechoice question turns on a related and more complicated matter of
debate—the limits, if any, that restrict such waivers. The fact that a person
charged with a crime can be detained indefinitely with few, if any, Fourth
Amendment (let alone other constitutional) rights and the fact that persons
released under the federal-bail-reform laws are already subject to numerous
restrictions on their liberty and privacy,255 suggest that the Supreme Court
will ultimately uphold a pretrial agreement in which an arrested person
relinquishes some of her Fourth Amendment rights. The likelihood is
especially great given that waivers of constitutional rights have routinely
been approved in the equally coercive context of plea agreements. In other
words, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Scott was wrongly
decided.256
The tougher question, and the real crux of the pretrial-waiver issue, is
not whether, but under what conditions and/or circumstances persons
arrested but not convicted, can “voluntarily” relinquish their Fourth
Amendment rights. What parameters do, or should, limit or constrain such
waivers? At a minimum, there must be a direct correlation between
253. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
254. The Supreme Court has already held that the government’s regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987).
255. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979); supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Bell); see
also Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2000) (outlining the various
restrictions a magistrate judge can impose as a condition of pretrial release).
256. See also Recent Case, United States v. Scott, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1634–37 (2006)
[hereinafter Recent Case]. This Harvard Law Review Note commented on the original Scott
decision, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005), and opined that the majority’s reasoning in the Scott case
suffers from two limitations. Recent Case, supra, at 1634–37. First, the court took “consent into
account” in evaluating the reasonableness of a search, thereby allowing invalid consent to lessen
one’s expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 1634. Second, by using
consent as a factor, the court undermined “its bold assertion” that induced blanket “consent”
searches cannot make an unreasonable search reasonable. Id. at 1636. Both of these factors
undermine the effectiveness of the Scott court’s efforts to protect privacy and liberty rights. Id. at
1636–37.
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government searches and the defendant’s alleged crime. Whole-sale, blanket
waivers of Fourth Amendment rights certainly encourage greater
opportunities for abuse (intentional or not) by the government. “[F]or what
if the [pretrial-services] officer decided to camp in [the arrestee’s] home
and search him every five minutes?”257 Could an officer search every inch of
a defendant’s home and car, or just portions? A blanket waiver needs to
address specifically whether it covers searches of the defendant’s cellular
phones and computers. It also needs to address whether it reaches shared
computers and the rooms, drawers, and personal belongings of others who
live with the defendant/releasee. Not every blanket waiver should allow strip
searches and body-cavity inspections of an arrestee. Not every arrestee
should be subject to daily searches of the body and/or the home. At a
minimum, the crime charged must impose some Fourth Amendment limits.
In addition to limits on a waiver that the type and severity of the crime
may dictate, established principles in the Constitution and the Bail Reform
Act, as well as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and basic notions of
contract law, can effectively limit pretrial Fourth Amendment waivers. These
limits will allow defendants the benefits of such waivers without exposing
arrestees to unconscionable intrusions on their liberty and privacy rights.
A. LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION258
1.

The Eighth Amendment Forbids Excessive Bail

The Eighth Amendment protects arrested persons against potential
government abuse in the bail setting. The amendment declares that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”259 Bail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to assure the presence of an accused at trial or
to protect the public is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.260 While the
meaning of “excessive bail” (in this context) has not been determined, it is
reasonable to expect that the Eighth Amendment would prohibit a search
conducted pursuant to a pretrial release waiver, if the search were so
intrusive that it could be fairly described as out of proportion to the crime
257. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
258. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would no doubt impose some limits on the
rights the government may ask an arrested person to forego. With regard to equal protection,
the Fourteenth Amendment says that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment
provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” Id. amend. V. The corresponding due-process provision in the Fourteenth Amendment,
likewise, provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” Id. amend. XIV. A full discussion of the limits these constitutional
provisions may provide is outside the scope of this Article.
259. Id. amend. VIII.
260. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
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charged, or if the search bore little or no relationship to the legitimate lawenforcement needs for undertaking the search. For example, if an arrested
person with no criminal history were charged with conspiring to commit
fraud and she “agreed” to subject herself to random, daily strip searches and
body-cavity inspections to gain release from pretrial detention, in light of the
charges and the characteristics of the arrestee, the Eighth Amendment
should effectively strike that condition as excessive bail.261 When the
conditions of pretrial release, including a Fourth Amendment waiver, are
unreasonably oppressive in light of the crime charged, the conditions
constitute excessive bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As the Ninth
Circuit said in United States v. Scott, “There may . . . be cases where the risk of
flight is so slight that any amount of bail is excessive; release on one’s own
recognizance would then be constitutionally required, which could further
limit the government’s discretion to fashion conditions of release.”262 The
court further stated:
The right to keep someone in jail does not in any way imply the
right to release that person subject to unconstitutional
conditions—such as chopping off a finger or giving up one’s firstborn. Once [the government] decides to release a criminal
defendant pending trial, the [government] may impose only such
conditions as are constitutional, including compliance with the
prohibition against excessive bail.263
The Scott court was right about these limits. While the lines are far from
bright on what pretrial conditions would be so disproportionate as to violate
the Eighth Amendment, if the excessive-bail provision of the Eighth
Amendment means anything, it would invalidate some pretrial waivers as
excessive bail. Thus, the Eighth Amendment would limit Fourth
Amendment waivers that were unduly broad.
2.

The Fourth Amendment Requires Reasonableness

Although the Supreme Court has not settled whether a pretrial arrestee
can consent to a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of his or her
release, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that all
Fourth Amendment searches are confined and governed by
reasonableness.264 Reasonableness is a flexible, fluid standard that is
dependent on the context:

261. Excessive, non-proportional searches are essentially what the Second Circuit was
worried about in Lifshitz. See supra Part I.D. Although the court’s decision in Lifshitz did not rest
on the Eighth Amendment, the Second Circuit expressly addressed proportionality. See id.
262. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006).
263. Id.
264. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). In fact, reasonableness is
demanded by the text of the Fourth Amendment itself. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of
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The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it,
and the place in which it is conducted.265
In other words, reasonableness is judged in light of the “totality of the
circumstances.”266 Although it is unclear what “reasonableness” requires in
the context of a pretrial releasee who signs a blanket waiver of her Fourth
Amendment rights, reasonableness viewed from a totality-of-thecircumstances perspective will continue to serve as an outer parameter on
every search of an arrested person and her home, whether or not she
executes a pretrial-release waiver.
In United States v. Henry, the Sixth Circuit showed that the
reasonableness standard can have teeth.267 The court applied the standard to
invalidate an officer’s search of a probationer’s home because the officer
“did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the search.”268
The Sixth Circuit noted that a probationer’s consent to a blanket-search
condition is “‘a salient circumstance’ in determining whether the
reasonable-suspicion-based investigatory search of a probationer’s residence
[is] reasonable,”269 but found that the particular search exceeded those
bounds of reasonableness.270
The Second Circuit has also used the well-established reasonableness
standard to restrict the search conditions a sentencing court may place on a
probationer as part of his probation.271 In deciding that a probation
condition requiring computer monitoring for a defendant convicted of a
child-pornography charge was unduly broad, the Second Circuit showed
sensitivity to conditions resulting in a “deprivation of liberty ‘greater . . .
than is reasonably necessary.’”272 The court explained the standard as
follows:

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” ).
265. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
266. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; see also supra note 70 (discussing the totality-of-thecircumstances test).
267. United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2005).
268. Id. at 614.
269. Id. at 614 n.11 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118).
270. Id. at 614. Perhaps the Scott majority also simply intended to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard has teeth. But in discounting the importance of Scott’s
written Fourth Amendment waiver in the reasonableness equation, the court erred.
271. See generally United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
272. Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002)).
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We must assess the necessary scope of the monitoring condition in
light of the ‘special needs’ articulated in this particular case, those
of rehabilitating Lifshitz and ensuring that he does not inflict
further harm on the community by receiving or disseminating
child pornography during the probationary period. In order to
comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the
monitoring condition must be narrowly tailored, and not sweep so
broadly as to draw a wide swath of extraneous material into its
net.273
The Second Circuit reiterated Supreme Court precedent noting “that
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment does not require
employing the least intrusive means, [but that] the means employed must
bear a close and substantial relation to the government’s interest in
pursuing the search.”274 Applying this reasonableness standard, the Second
Circuit concluded that the scope of the Fourth Amendment computermonitoring condition imposed on Lifshitz “may, therefore, be overbroad.”275
In short, the reasonableness requirement in the Fourth Amendment text
and existing precedent interpreting that reasonableness requirement will
effectively limit pretrial waivers of the rights the Fourth Amendment
protects.
B. OTHER LIMITS TO A PRETRIAL WAIVER OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
1.

The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is another potential
restriction on pretrial release conditioned on the waiver of an arrested
person’s Fourth Amendment rights. Generally, this doctrine “precludes the
government from coercing the waiver of a constitutional right either by
conditioning the exercise of one constitutional right on the waiver of
another . . . or by attaching conditions that penalize the exercise of a
constitutional right . . . .”276 Although the Supreme Court has applied the

273. Id. at 190.
274. Id. at 192 (internal quotations omitted).
275. Id. at 193.
276. United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 665 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968)); see also
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (explaining that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits the government from forcing a person to waive the right to
receive just compensation for property taken for public use in exchange for a benefit that is
unrelated to that property); United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2006);
Mazzone, supra note 195, at 806–30 (discussing the history of the development of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–76 (1989) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
thoroughly). The District Court for the Western District of Virginia noted:
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the First Amendment context and to
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases,277 the doctrine has rarely been used
to limit the government’s power in the criminal context.278
The Court has, albeit sparingly,279 applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in criminal cases to invalidate government-imposed
choices that “needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.”280
Although the Supreme Court did not say that it was applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it did so in United States v. Jackson and
concluded that “the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act
impose[d] an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a [criminal
defendant’s] constitutional right.”281
In Jackson, the defendant challenged the federal criminal kidnaping
statute because it did not provide a procedure for imposing the death
penalty on defendants who waived their Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.282 Under the statute, only a jury could recommend a sentence of

An important basis for the constitutional conditions doctrine, however, is that in
some instances the condition itself is unconstitutional because of its power to
coerce a citizen into unwillingly surrendering a constitutional right in exchange
for a governmental benefit, rendering of little import the fact that the citizen
formally “agreed” to the exchange.
Stephens v. County of Albemarle, No. Civ.A.3:04CV00081, 2005 WL 3533428, at *7 (W.D. Va.
Dec. 22, 2005) (citation omitted).
277. See Mazzone, supra note 195, at 810, 822 (presenting a fuller discussion of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in these contexts).
278. Even when the Supreme Court has applied this doctrine in the criminal context, it has
not called it by name. See, e.g., Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 (holding that it was legally
impermissible to require a criminal defendant to give up a potentially valid Fourth Amendment
challenge to protect a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). Mazzone contends
that the “waiver doctrine” is applied in the criminal setting and that the “unconstitutional
conditions doctrine” is used in civil cases. Mazzone, supra note 195, at 844. Mazzone states that
these are two “independent doctrines” developed by the Supreme Court “for what is a single
problem.” Id. Mazzone asserts that “[w]hereas the [Supreme Court] routinely invalidates deals
involving First Amendment rights, it takes exactly the opposite approach” in evaluating criminal
bargains. Id. at 832. According to Mazzone, in criminal cases, the Supreme Court “assumes
deals between the government and criminal defendants are voluntary contracts conferring
mutual benefits.” Id. He asserts, “In the world of criminal waiver, coercion is replaced by choice;
freedom means the power to bargain, and the public’s interest lies in foregoing rights, not
keeping them intact. In sum, criminal waiver turns the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
on its head.” Id. Mazzone also claims that “[i]n the criminal context, conditional benefits are
understood to represent more, not less, choice.” Id. at 833.
279. The Court should apply the doctrine sparingly in the criminal context. An accused
facing the potential loss of liberty should retain latitude to bargain. It is appropriate that he
hold an expanded array of constitutional and statutory rights with which to deal because so
much is at risk.
280. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581–82 (1968).
281. Id. at 572.
282. Id. at 571, 581.
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death.283 Thus, a defendant’s assertion of her right to a jury trial could
realistically cost the defendant her life.284 In contrast, a plea of guilty or a
bench trial would necessarily save the defendant from a possible death
sentence.285 In evaluating the case, the Supreme Court framed the issue as
“whether the Constitution permits the establishment of such a death
penalty, applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest
their guilt before a jury.”286 The Court remarked, “The inevitable effect of
any such provision, is of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth
Amendment right not to plead guilty[] and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”287 The Court held that because of
these effects, the statute unduly chilled a criminal defendant’s exercise of his
constitutional rights. “Whatever might be said of Congress’ objectives, they
cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights.”288 The Court deemed such an intrusion on a criminal
defendant’s rights “unnecessary and therefore excessive.”289
The same year, in Simmons v. United States, the Supreme Court applied
an unconstitutional-conditions-type analysis to save a criminal defendant
from choosing between the loss of his Fourth Amendment rights and the
preservation of his “Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.”290
In Simmons, the Court held that when a criminal defendant “testifies in
support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds,
his testimony [cannot later be used] against him at trial on the issue of [his]
guilt.”291 In reaching this decision, the Court explained that when a criminal
defendant is confronted with a “choice” between foregoing the right to
challenge adverse evidence and testifying with the possibility that the
testimony may be used against him on the issue of guilt in a later trial, “an
undeniable tension” is created because the defendant is placed in a situation
where “the ‘benefit’ to be gained is that afforded by another provision of the
Bill of Rights.”292 In such circumstances, the Court “f[ou]nd it intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another.”293 The Court has maintained its adherence to this concept
and has subsequently reiterated:

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 582.
Id.
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort,
and for an agent of the [government] to pursue a course of action
whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights
is “patently unconstitutional.”294
While the Supreme Court has not recently applied an unconstitutionalconditions-type analysis in a criminal case, it has never repudiated its
decisions in Jackson or Simmons. Moreover, the federal government seems to
accept the doctrine’s application in appropriate criminal cases.295
Consequently, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will limit the reach
of a pretrial Fourth Amendment rights waiver.
Although the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will provide some
bounds on an arrestee’s blanket Fourth Amendment waiver, the Supreme
Court’s decisions since Jackson and Simmons clarify that the doctrine does not
“forbid[] every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has
the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.”296 Even if
circumstances discourage a defendant from asserting his trial rights, the
mere fact that the defendant’s decision is a “difficult” one does not place an
impermissible burden on a right,297 especially if the pressure to forego that
right is marked by speculation or remoteness.298 “[S]peculative prospects”
regarding the impact of exercising one’s constitutional rights do not
“interfere with the right to make a free choice.”299

294. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citation omitted) (quoting Chaffin
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33 n.20 (1973)).
295. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001) (acknowledging the
government’s argument that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine acts as a “limitation on
what a probationer may validly consent to in a probation order” and the government’s
contention that the search condition at issue did not exceed that limit “because waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights ‘directly furthers the State’s interest in the effective administration
of its probation system’” (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (No. 001260))). The government’s position in Knights coincides with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Jackson and Simmons. See supra notes 13–14. Although in Knights the Supreme Court
acknowledged the government’s unconstitutional conditions argument, the Court did not rule
on it. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 n.4.
296. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 30.
297. Id. at 35.
298. Id. at 33.
299. Id. at 35. In Chaffin, the Court emphasized the remote nature of the possibility that a
defendant would receive a harsher jury sentence upon retrial if he exercised his right to appeal
and was successful. Id. at 33. The Court indicated that “the likelihood of actually receiving a
harsher sentence is quite remote at the time a convicted defendant begins to weigh the
question whether he will appeal.” Id. The Court further enumerated the speculative prospects:
First, his appeal must succeed. Second, it must result in an order remanding the
case for retrial rather than dismissing outright. Third, the prosecutor must again
make the decision to prosecute and the accused must again select trial by jury
rather than securing a bench trial or negotiating a plea.

WILSON_PP_TO_ILR

11/14/2006 2:21:06 PM

THE PRICE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE

205

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,300 the Supreme Court distinguished certain
cases in which it had previously found the violation of a criminal defendant’s
due-process rights when one constitutional right was conditioned on the
forbearance of another.301 The Supreme Court explained that due-process
violations “lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from
the exercise of a legal right but rather in the danger that the [government]
might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction.”302 The Court also declared that “[d]efendants advised by
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are
presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial
persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.”303
Even more recently, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, a
unanimous Court304 rejected an inmate’s argument that a state clemency
process forced him to make an unlawful “Hobson’s choice” between
asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his right
to participate in a clemency-review process.305 Woodard claimed that the
choice violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.306 The Supreme
Court dodged a discussion of the doctrine noting, “[W]e find it unnecessary
to address [the unconstitutional conditions doctrine] in deciding this case.
In our opinion, the procedures of the [clemency] Authority do not under
any view violate the Fifth Amendment privilege.”307 The Court reasoned
further:
It is difficult to see how a voluntary interview could “compel”
respondent to speak. He merely faces a choice quite similar to the
sorts of choices that a criminal defendant must make in the course

Id.
300. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–63 (1978). In Bordenkircher, a state prisoner
sought habeas relief, claiming that his due-process rights were violated when a state prosecutor
carried through on a threat to reindict him on more serious charges if he did not plead guilty
to the offense originally charged. Id. at 358–59. The defendant in Bordenkircher refused to plead,
and the prosecutor reindicted him under a habitual-criminal statute. Id. at 359.
301. The Court distinguished cases like North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969),
which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits vindictiveness
against a defendant for successfully attacking his first conviction, and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 28–29 (1974), which held that due process is infringed when a prosecutor reindicts a
defendant on a felony charge after the defendant successfully invokes an appellate remedy for a
misdemeanor conviction.
302. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted).
303. Id. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970)).
304. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 272 (1998). The Woodard decision
spawned several splits in the Court, but not on the unconstitutional conditions issue.
305. Id. at 286.
306. Id. at 272, 279, 285–86.
307. Id. at 286.
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of criminal proceedings, none of which has ever been held to
violate the Fifth Amendment.308
The Supreme Court concluded that Woodard had freely exercised a
“choice.”309
Unlike the Supreme Court, which has only implicitly recognized the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the criminal context, and then only
in a limited manner, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
doctrine to criminal cases. For instance, in Wilcox v. Johnson, the court held
that a criminal defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights when he
was asked to choose between his statutory right to testify and his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.310 Wilcox had been convicted of rape in
1967.311 During that trial, his defense hinged on an alibi.312 Wilcox was
convicted in that trial, but his conviction was later reversed and he was
retried.313 At the retrial, his lawyer abandoned the alibi defense in favor of a
consent defense without consulting Wilcox.314 Wilcox objected to this
change in trial strategy.315 Mid-trial, Wilcox told his lawyer that he wanted to
testify and to call witnesses to corroborate his alibi.316 Wilcox’s lawyer
disagreed.317 The disagreement between Wilcox and his lawyer “grew more
pronounced” and at a side-bar conference, the lawyer informed the trial
judge that she planned to move to withdraw as counsel based on her belief
that Wilcox intended to perjure himself.318 The lawyer then told Wilcox that
if Wilcox demanded to testify, the judge would allow her to withdraw, and
Wilcox would have to proceed pro se.319 The Third Circuit described the
difficult choice Wilcox faced as a “completely untenable position.”320
According to the court, Wilcox had been:
put to a Hobson’s choice[]: decline to testify and lose the
opportunity of conveying his version of the facts to the jury, or take
the stand and forego his fundamental right to be assisted by
counsel. The Trial Judge thus conditioned the exercise of Mr.
Wilcox’s statutory right to testify upon the waiver of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . A defendant in a criminal
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id.
Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286.
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 116–17.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 120.
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proceeding is entitled to certain rights and protections which
derive from a variety of sources. He is entitled to all of them; he
cannot be forced to barter one for another. When the exercise of
one right is made contingent upon the forbearance of another,
both rights are corrupted.321
The First Circuit has also recognized that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine may apply in a criminal case to invalidate some
“choices” that require the relinquishment of one right in favor of another.
In the context of ruling that a criminal defendant does not have to accept
responsibility for dismissed charges to gain an acceptance reduction under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the First Circuit declared:
Clearly, a defendant does not have a “free choice to admit, to deny,
or to refuse to answer” if he knows he will be incarcerated for a
longer period of time if he does not make the incriminating
statements. The touchstone of the fifth amendment is compulsion,
and the Supreme Court has recognized that imprisonment is one
of a wide variety of penalties which can serve to trigger a
constitutional violation.322
Accordingly, while the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been
sparingly applied to invalidate a criminal defendant’s “choice” between two
competing constitutional rights, the Supreme Court appears to have
accepted the doctrine and certainly has never expressly rejected its
application. The federal government has, in argument before the Supreme
Court, conceded the doctrine’s applicability to criminal cases,323 and some
circuit courts have expressly applied the doctrine to save defendants from
facing a choice of one important constitutional right at the expense of
another.324 Thus, defendants should continue to press the issue, particularly
if an arrested person is asked to consent to an overly broad waiver of her
Fourth Amendment rights and/or is asked to sign such a waiver because the
prosecutor or case agent demonstrates a desire to retaliate against the
defendant for her lack of cooperation or out of a spirit of vindictiveness. For

321. Id.; see also United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he effect of
requiring a defendant to accept responsibility for crimes other than those to which he
pled guilty [for the purpose of reducing his offense level as provided by the Sentencing
Guidelines] . . . is to penalize him for refusing to incriminate himself. This runs afoul of the
fifth amendment.”). But see Ebbole v. United States, 8 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting a
split among the circuits as to “whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated when
he is denied an offense level reduction for not accepting responsibility for crimes related to his
offense of conviction”).
322. United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977)).
323. See United States v. Knights, 234 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001); see also supra Part I.C.2
(discussing Knights).
324. See, e.g., Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 463; Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 120.
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when a pretrial arrestee is induced by the government to relinquish Fourth
Amendment rights for minor charges, out of retaliation for failing to
cooperate in the government’s investigation of others, or for refusing to
plead guilty at an initial appearance, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, which protects defendants from being forced to preserve one
fundamental right at the expense of another, should invalidate such waivers.
2.

Limits in the Bail Reform Act

The Bail Reform Act contains built-in limits on the rights an arrested
person may be asked or required to relinquish to gain pretrial release. That
Act mandates that the judicial officer deciding bail impose the “least
restrictive” conditions necessary to ensure that the arrestee appears at trial
and that the public is adequately protected.325 If no legitimate grounds
support the government’s imposition of a Fourth Amendment waiver
condition to protect the public or ensure the defendant’s appearance in
court, the judicial officer must reject such a provision as beyond the least
restrictive condition(s) required to fulfill the goals of the Act. Moreover,
while the Bail Reform Act does not specifically demand such an inquiry, to
ensure that an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment waiver is knowing and
voluntary, the presiding judicial officer should ask all the questions that
judges routinely ask during change-of-plea hearings and/or when a
defendant seeks to waive his Sixth Amendment rights.326 In addressing a
defendant’s waiver of Sixth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has
indicated that “a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the
circumstances of the case before him demand.”327 According to the Court,
“[a] judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of [rights] is
understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and
comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such [a
waiver] is tendered.”328 Requiring a magistrate judge to make a similar
inquiry of arrestees will help document the voluntary and knowing nature of

325.
326.

Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 203, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2000).
In the plea context, voluntariness means:
“‘[E]ntered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual
value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, . . . [not] induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises),
or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).’”

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d
101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting)).
327. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 244 n.32 (1973) (citing Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723–24 (1948)).
328. Id.

WILSON_PP_TO_ILR

11/14/2006 2:21:06 PM

THE PRICE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE

209

the waiver.329 This additional inquiry will not be burdensome, given the
magistrate judge’s duty “to advise the [arrested] person of the penalties for
violating [any] condition[s] of release,”330 but will serve as another safeguard
for arrestees asked to forego important Fourth Amendment rights.
3.

Contractual Limits

The express, written terms of the waiver will also define its reach.
Generally, “‘when law enforcement officers rely on consent as the basis for a
warrantless search, the scope of the consent given determines the
permissible scope of the search.’”331 As the Sixth Circuit noted in rejecting
the government’s argument that a probationer consented to a contraband
search as a condition of his probation, “even if [the probationer] could
consent to searches by agreeing to this search condition, the complained-of
search was not encompassed by the condition and therefore would not have
been included in the consent.”332 The court respected the limits of the
consent given by the probationer.333 “[I]t is clear that consent to a home visit
does not encompass consent to a full search.”334 Similarly, an arrestee’s
consent to a warrantless search of her computer would not imply the
government’s right to search her person or her purse, unless the
government complied with the usual Fourth Amendment mandates.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that a
probationer’s blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is limited by the
“contract” reached between the government and the probationer. In United
States v. Barnett, the court focused on the plea-bargain “contract” that
contained the blanket-search terms, noting that such agreements include
implicit and explicit terms.335 “‘[A] contract will not be interpreted literally if
doing so would produce absurd results, in the sense of results that the
parties, presumed to be rational persons pursuing rational ends, are very
unlikely to have agreed to seek.’”336 The Seventh Circuit stated that a waiver

329. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (stating that in the context of waiver
of counsel, “[t]he record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show,
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer,”
and that “[a]nything less is not waiver”).
330. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h).
331. United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624,
630 (1946) (recognizing implicitly that an agreement in which a Navy contractor acquiesces in
inspections of his accounts to obtain the government’s business was limited in scope and that
the agreement did not “include consent to the taking of [a] check”).
332. Henry, 429 F.3d at 614–15.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2005).
336. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d
856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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of Fourth Amendment rights would not cover “searches that have no
possible law-enforcement objective, or that so far exceed any legitimate
enforcement needs as to compel an inference that the purpose and only
effect were harassment.”337 In short, the court explained that it would
interpret contractual language “‘in light of common sense.’”338
Because an agreement between the government and an arrested person
is a contract, any unconscionable terms or ambiguity would be governed by
common rules of contract law, which seek, where possible, to glean the
intentions of the parties.339 Therefore, the magistrate judge, defense
counsel, and government counsel should make every effort to ensure that
the terms of any agreement in which an arrestee waives Fourth Amendment
rights are clear and simple to understand. This clarity will make the parties’
intentions apparent and avoid conflicts regarding what the waiver covers.
With a clear, written agreement of the scope of the arrestee’s rights waiver,
the arrested person can evaluate whether release is worth the Fourth
Amendment infringement; the government agencies will know what they
can and cannot search; and the federal courts can properly enforce such
waivers against the government and the arrested person in subsequent
disputes.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment serves an important constitutional function. It
protects the privacy of Americans from intrusions on their personal security.
Few rights are held more sacred. When a person is arrested and faces the
real likelihood of pretrial detention in jail, the person risks not only a
reduction in his privacy rights, but also a loss of his liberty. In such
circumstances, the arrested person should be able to bargain away some of
his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the additional freedoms
associated with release to home.
Undoubtedly, defendants forced to choose between incarceration and
Fourth Amendment rights will almost always choose to forego their Fourth
Amendment protections. But these rights are theirs to value and to bargain
away. The Eighth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Bail Reform
Act, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and basic offer-andacceptance principles of contract law will limit the scope of such waivers

337. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981)).
338. Id. at 693 (quoting McElroy v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 73 F.3d 722, 726–27 (7th Cir.
1996)).
339. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 66 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (noting that the clear
intent of contracting parties as expressed in the plain text of an agreement governs the terms of
the agreement); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 356 (1910) (noting that the Court
construes contracts to give full force to their written terms unless the language of the contract is
ambiguous or uncertain).
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and, hence, prevent the government from abusing a pretrial defendant’s
vulnerability to waive his rights. Accordingly, when, as part of a bail hearing,
a neutral magistrate judge finds that a federal criminal defendant voluntarily
and knowingly chooses to waive (at least some of) her Fourth Amendment
rights in favor of pretrial release, and also determines that such a waiver
constitutes the least-intrusive means of ensuring that the defendant will
appear at trial and in the meantime not endanger witnesses or the public,
such a waiver is legally valid and should be permitted, if not encouraged.

